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In luce Tua
Comment on the Significant News by the Editors
The Case for Conse rvatism
There is a case for conservatism which has been argued ably and eloquently by such statesmen as Quintin
Hogg in England and Robert A. Taft in the United
States and by such writers as Russell Kirk. By temperament, training, environment, and theological persuasion we have long been drawn to this Hogg-Taft-Kirk
brand of conservatism because it posits a doctrine of
man which takes seriously , on the one hand , his fallenness and , on the other hand , his moral responsibility to
make his own decisions in an environment of the widest possible range of free choice.
The fallenness of man makes a true conservative reluctant to trust any man to play God. He doubts
man's moral capacity to resist the corruption of power
and his intellectual capacity to give men better answers
to their problems than they can work out for themselves. He is inclined to look askance at any proposal
to "build Jerusalem in England 's green and pleasant
land " - not because he would not wish to do so but
because he takes with full seriousness the fact that man
is an exile from paradi~e lost , condemned for all of the
days of his life to hope for more than he can have and
to long for that which he has irretrievably lost. The
conservative view of life is essentially tragic .
This does not mean that the conservative merely
throws up his hands in despair when he is confronted
by human need. He does what he can , individually
and in association with other people, to relieve the
need. But he is haunted by the fact , attested to through
all of history, that so often the cures which men prescribe are worse than the ailments they were intended
to alleviate. In the general area of welfare, for instance, the conservative weighs the value of a proposed
solution to a given problem against its long-term consequences ; he is concerned not to turn the man who is
needy today into a man who will be dependent the rest
of his life. There is , the conservative knows, a discipline of suffering and hardship which ought not to be
dismissed too lightly , even from the noblest humanitarian motives.
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The conservative is inclined to temper a bas ic idealism with what he believes to be the realities of human
nature and the counsel of history. He is compassionate ,
expecting no more than is human from other men and
promising them no more than man can offer man. He
is reluctant to exchange that which has worked reasonably well in the past for that which mig ht theoreticall y
work better. And he loves freedom, not as a license to
pursue his own narrow ends but as the essential precondition to moral choice and action.

The Difficult Choice
Disturbed as we have been by certain traits in President Johnson's personality and by some of the stillunexplained manipulations of his financia l and poli tical career, we had hoped that Senator Goldwater would
turn out to be a genuine conservative with no worse
defect than a tendency to put his foot in his mouth
from time to time.
This, we regret to say, has not happened. Both in
word and in deed - and even more so in attitude Senator Goldwater has exposed himself as a counterfeit conservative. If the word had not been thrown
about so loosely as to lose all meaning, we wou ld cal l
him a reactionary. That he happens to be a gruff,
likable, he-man reactionary is , in the context of a presidential election, beside the point. He simp ly does not
comprehend the complexities of the present or the
threats and promises of the future.
He has decried the extension of federal power , but
he has attempted to convict the President of responsibility for local disorders. He has promised a series of
five annual budget cuts and an end to Selective Service , but he calls for beefi ng up the nation's military
might . He has talked about tactical nuclear weapons "the kind that a man might carry on his back" - as
though they reall y ex isted and he has indicated an
alarmingly liberal will ingness to share control of their
use , as Pres ident , with one or more fie ld generals. He
has pledged himself to enforce the Civ il Rights Law,
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but he has eagerly accepted the support of the most intransigent segregationists . He has demanded a restoration of law and order, but he has welcomed rather
than repudiated the anarchistic extremism of the John
Birch Society and similar organizations to whom the
late Senator Joseph McCarthy is still a hero.
Lyndon Johnson is a man of insufferable ego and
oily craftiness whose meteoric rise from rags to riches
has raised many an eyebrow, including our own. But
in the conduct of the Presidency he has shown vision ,
restraint, responsibility, and enormous dedication .
We are allergic to his particular brand of corn and we
have some misgivings about the limits of his ambitions ,
but his record to date is one which invites confidence.
We find ourself more and more often comparing him
to President Chester A. Arthur , whose personal qualities and pre-presidential record left much to be desired but who made an excellent President . And it is ,
after all, a President that we are electing this month not Mr. Congeniality or an elder of the church.
For us , therefore, the choice is hard , but it is clear .
For many of our best friends , the choice is easy and
clear - and different than ours. Whichever way the
decision goes on November 3, the nation will have
elected a President who will be the President of all of
us . We are prepared to support him with our prayers ,
our labors, our encouragement, and our criticism .

The Warren Report
The report of the Warren Commission on the assassination of President Kennedy will not , we suspect,
satisfy those at home, and especially abroad , who cannot believe that one twisted mind could be the author
of such a world-shaking tragedy. There must have
been, these people insist, some great and well-organized conspiracy, of which Oswald was at most only a
willing tool. Moscow identifies these conspirators as
Texas oil men who , allegedly , plotted the assassination at a meeting in Chicago. West European liberals ,
remembering Dallas' reputation as a hot-bed of rightist
extremism, hint that Oswald was made the scapegoat
for a crime that was actually engineered and executed
by rightist groups. And there has been a disposition
among some of our own political and theological liberals to explain Oswald as a kind of Everyman, enacting
the suppressed desires of an allegedly hate-filled society.
The question which these reactions raises is: Why
should there be such a stubborn refusal to accept the
simple, amply documented fact that one man , acting on
his own, could and did murder the President? Certainly it can not be because it is intrinsically impossible for one man to commit such a crime ; both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy knew, and
told their friends, precisely how it could be done. The
reason for this refusal seems to be that our generation
cannot bring itself to believe that the single, solitary
individual, working entirely on his own , can block the
4

stream of history and divert it into a new channel.
We have, all of us - liberal, conservative, and middle-of-the-roader - become collectivists in our basic
assumptions about man and society. We no longer see
men as individuals torn between the divine and the
demonic , but as specimens of some collectivity - political, economic, social, racial , religious, or even psychological. We could be satisfied with a finding that
Oswald was the agent of a Marxist plot or a rightwing plot ; that he was a proletarian whose hand was
inevitably set against a wealthy President ; that he was
an outcast whose resentments drove him to destroy the
visible symbol of ordered society ; that he was a segregationist infuriated by the President's advocacy of civil
rights; that he was a Protestant lashed by hatred of a
Roman Catholic President ; or that he was a homicidal
paranoid whom society had failed to identify and treat.
But it challenges our doctrine of man to a.ccept the
fact that a man named Lee Harvey Oswald, acting
from what mixture of motives we do not know, decided
to murder somebody important, bought a gun, and did
it - on his own . It offends our belief in the essential
rationality of things to be told that Oswald had considered killing Richard Nixon , had tried to murder
General Walker, and finally ended up assassinating the
President, apparently for no better reason than that he
wanted to kill somebody important enough that his
death would attract attention to the killer. This kind
of purposefulness - or shall we call it purposelessness? - smacks too much of the demonic to fit
into a universe from which, we thought, modern man
had exorcised all of the demons. It makes more of
man , for good or evil , than we are willing to accept .
It suggests that every one of us may have within him
the power to shake the universe , for good or for ill ,
and that for our use of that power we. must someday
give an accounting.
For if the man Lee Harvey Oswald had it in his
power to do the evil that he did , what countervailing
power must there not have been within him to do
good? And if, in any one man, there are these potentials , how can we ever be sure that we do not ourselves
possess the same potentials? And if we do , is it enough
that we do not give evil its head? Or must we be prepared to explain someday why we did not do the good
that we had it in our power to do?

Looking Toward the 21st Century
Southern newspaper editors have been congratulating their communities - and with good reason - on
the integration , without violence or disorder, of a number of formerly all-white schools this Fall. For the
first time since the Supreme Court's great decision of
ten years ago , integration is now a fact in every state
of the Union , and there is reason to hope that even
demogogic politicians have learned to accq>t it as a
necessary , if unpalatable, national policy which no
state can oppose indefinitely .
The Cresset

In the midst of these congratulations it is necessary , however, to remember that a great deal remains
to be done. Gratifying as it is to read the New York
Times headline: "Now All States Have Some Integration ," self-congratulation seems a bit premature when
one looks at the statistics , as they are given on the map
under the headline. This is a map showing the percentage of Negroes \\ho are attending schools with
white children in states of the old Confederacy, and
these are the figures:
Texas
7.66
3.27
Tennessee
Florida
2.77
Virginia
2.62
North Carolina
0.936
Arkansas
0.762
Georgia
0.297
0.224
Louisiana
South Carolina
0.097
Mississippi
0.021
Alabama
0.015
The tragedy of these figures is not political or sociological or ideological, but human . What they mean is
that in South Carolina, for instance, one Negro child in
a thousand is getting an education reasonably adequate
to equip him for living in the 21st century. The other
999 have been predestined to functional illiteracy , joblessness, and poverty. They will live to see their people free - of that there is no longer any doubt - but
they will not themselves be able to profit from their
freedom.
This i.s the real urgency of the problem. No one is
interested in pressing any crowns of thorn onto the
brow of the South. No one can altogether forget that
the states which rank lowest in the listing above suffered most under Reconstruction . But it is not the
past which we have to contend with in this matter.
It is the future. And this future , for the South as for
all of us. is a-building right now . This year's firstgraders. black and white , will be reaching their most
productive years in the year 2000. Now . not ten years
from now, we must answer th e question: What legacy
do we want to leave to the 21st century?

The New Breed
We spent an unusually profitable evening recently
with a Roman Catholic clergyman who has been , for
many years. principal of a high school. We were talking about the present generation of high school kids a topic in which , at the moment , we have considerably more than an academic interest - and this is
what he told us:
1. The great majority of them have not received any
affection at home and therefore do not know how to
g1ve or receive affection . Nevertheless , they seek affection. But they are suspicious of friendship. Popular
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Freudianism, plus perhaps the increase in homosexuality , has made friendship with members of one's own
sex suspect and has helped to produce such phenomena
as early dating with its concomitants of "going steady ,"
teen-age sexual experimentation, and early marriage.
2. This generation doesn't "dig" anything from deduction any more. This presents a problem for teachers in a Roman Catholic or Lutheran high school where
religion , at least, has traditionally been presented as
a set of facts and propositions from which meaningful
deductions could be made. Today's youngsters apparently start not from propositions but from questions,
and the teacher who is not answering their questions
is simply not getting through to them.
3. This is a generation which rejects hypocrisy.
Its one moral commitment is to honesty - a commitment which sometimes leads it to kinds of behavior
which its elders find distressing (particularly in matters of sexual conduct), but which , on the whole , is
refreshing.
Today's youngsters despise the "snow
job ," no matter how prestigious the individual or institution that tries to "snow" them.
4. These kids are , simultaneously, very selfish and
very idealistic. They want what they want when they
want it, and they want a great deal. But one of the
institutions which they respect most is the Peace Corps,
and many of them hope to serve in it. Their disposition is to "play it cool" and remain as uninvolved as
possible, but they believe passionately in a continuum
between belief and action.
5. In every stage of their maturing - grade school,
high school. post-high school - they reject the beliefs
of the previous stage and fear that they are losing their
faith. For the teacher of religion , especially. this means
that he dare not give them the impression, at any one
of these stages. that he is merely re-hashing what they
had learned in an earlier stage. And it means also
that they need parental and pastoral reassurance that
the healthy process of "putting away childish things"
is not , in itself, apostasy.
These are , we think , significant observations which
ought to be taken into account by all of us who consider ourselves called to "do something" for these
young people . It is a natural temptation to want to
create a new generation in our own image, despite
what we say about ourselves on Sunday mornings as
"poor, miserable sinners. " And it can be a profound
love that tempts us to force upon our children a prefabricated set of values , dogmas, and mores. But we
have to deal not with what might have been or even
with what ought to be, but with what is. So (quite
literally) for God's sake we can at least get off the
backs of those among us who do understand this generation and who , in their strange and sometimes disturbing ways , are trying to communicate to them the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
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The Try That Must Not Fail

Vat ican 11:3

Fourscore and seventeen years ago, the fathers of
Canadian confederation brought forth on this continent
a new nation, conceived in generous compromise and
dedicated to the proposition that men of reason and
good will, whatever their differences of language and
religion and culture, could live together in freedom
under law.
For the past three years, Canada has been torn by
separatist movements , testing whether Canada or any
other nation which respects and encourages cultural
diversity among its people can long endure. For Canada this time of testing could end in the tragedy of
secession and atomization. For men of reason and good
will the world over, the failure of the Canadian experiment would kill a dream which has never seemed possible of attainment, except that in large measure it has
been realized in Canada: the dream that in some pleasant corner of the earth men might live and work together in peace and mutual respect without having to
lose the great and admirable legacies of their past for
the sake of some synthetic nationhood.
That this dream could never come true without tensions and frictions must have been obvious from the
start. There is a tried and tested way of forging unity
out of human diversity: destroy those who will not conform to the new pattern and reduce everyone else to a
faceless form in a colorless mass. This has been the
way of the tyrant, whether he be autocrat or democrat. lt was not the way the Fathers of Confederation
chose and it is not, we dare to believe, the way that the
great majority of Canadians - French-speaking or
English-speaking - would choose today.
But if homogenization is not the way , neither is secession and atomization. The greatness of Canada is
more than the greatness of any one of its nationalities.
Cartier, MacDonald. Mackenzie. Smith, Laurier , Borden. Osler, Bell , Mackenzie King , Massey, St. Laurent - these were not provincial men content to drift
with the current of the past: they were Canadians who
built the greatness of many traditions into a country
whose voice is heard and respected in the counsels of
the nations.
Why all this passionate concern south of the border?
Because Canada is an experiment that must not fail.
Someone - and history has assigned this high mission to the Canadians - must prove to the world that
reasonable men of many languages and cultures can
sit down together in parliament and work out ways of
living together in harmony and mutual respect . lf
Canada can't do it , why even hope for a parliament of
man, a confederation of the world?

Only time can tell whether a New York Times reporter was right when he prefaced a report on the
third session of the Second Vatican Council with the
statement that "The Roman Catholic Church has made
more progress toward renewal and modernization in
the last two weeks than in the last century." If he is
right, this is an occasion for rejoicing. But whether
he is right or not, the Council has accomplished one
great thing; it has shattered the old Protestant image
of Rome as a monolith impervious to those winds of
change which have sculptured and changed the rest of
Christendom.
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What we have seen is a Church patiently and carefully trying to decant new wine into old wineskins.
Some, at least , of this new wine is Wittenberg, vintage 1530, and no one is quite sure how it will mix
with Trent, vintag·e 1563. It is heartening to see that
the two have blended in certain of the Council Fathers
with happy results. They are living refutations of the
old cliche, Roma semper eadem.
lt is worth noting that these champions of reform
are men who first came to the attention of the Church
as Biblical scholars. Few Protestants are yet aware of
the renaissance of Biblical studies which has been
going on in the Roman Catholic Church in the past
fifty years. But it is the flowering of this renaissance
that we have seen in Vatican 11. And there is a kind
of irony in the fact that this rediscovery of the Scriptures should have taken place in Roman Catholicism
at the same time that so much of Protestantism has
been abandoning the Scriptures in favor of books
about the Scriptures. lt would be an even greater
irony if the day should come when Roman Catholics
and Protestants should find it difficult to talk to each
other because of Protestant ignorance of, or indifference to , the Scriptures.
Meanwhile , of course. we must regretfully accept the
fact that the reunion of Western Christendom is not a
thing that any of us will see in our lifetime. Our generation , too. must live with the tragedy of a divided
Church , the scandal of a fractured una sancta et catholica ecclesia. But if we must live with it , we can at
least live with it in penitence and in charity toward
those brethren from whom we are outwardly divided.
This is far less than the oneness for which our Lord
prayed on the night in whtch He was betrayed, but it
is far more than we have been able to manage these
past four hundred years.
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By-Products of Computers
-------------8 y

A L F R E D

Who's afraid of electronic computers and their effect
on the future? Almost everyone, except Henry M.
Boettinger and the people who make the machines. I
have not talked with anyone who is an authority on the
subject, which is to say, I have not talked it over with
my barber, but I gather part of our fear is based on a
lack of knowledge . jiowever, the more I find out about
the computers , the more frightened I get for the future .
Mr. Boettinger, assistant comptroller for A.T . & T .,
is an authority , and he is not concerned over what
computers might do to the future. In an article in the
Bell Telephone Magazine, he expresses the opinion
that computers not only have a salutary effect on the
present but they will also produce secondary effects
which should make for interesting social changes.
No one can anticipate these secondary effects and
Mr. Boettinger cites an interesting example of this .
For well over a thousand years, no one heard anything
about the Arabs. They had little effect on history in
that period of time and Europeans tended to treat them
as sub-human. But for the last decade, the Arabs have
been jumping. Not only are they active, but they also
have a sense of destiny and some show of unity . What
caused this change?
It wasn't Nasser nor was it the oil under Arab soil
that were the primary causes of this change, says Mr.
Boettinger, but the invention of the Japanese transistor radio . Now every Arab village, every oasis , in
fact , almost every Arab owns a cheap transistor radio.
And every radio is tuned to Radio Cairo, "the voice of
the Arabs ," which broadcasts twenty-four hours a day .
At last the Arab , whose illiteracy has prevented concerted action in the past, can hear broadcasts in his
own language, broadcasts which remind him of past
glory and call him to present action. This is an example of the secondary effects of an invention .
Many historians have pointed out that one reason
for the success of Luther's theses and the change they
made in the world was the invention of the printing
press. There was little new in the theses Luther nailed
to the door of the Wittenberg church, though his
strong prose style gave them a new cast. But the
printing press made it possible to reproduce and distribute Luther's message and thus helped to change
the course of world history.
These are secondary effects of inventions and they
are impossible to anticipate. Surely no one asked a
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Japanese manufacturer, "What effect do you think
these new transistor radios will have on Arab unity? "
And no one asked Gutenberg, "What effect do you
think printing will have on European society?" That
computers will have strong secondary effects is beyond
doubt, but only time can tell what they will be . We
can hope they produce changes which are personal and
warm , or just the opposite of the effects the computers
are now producing. It is this impersonality of computers which scares us now.
Not long ago I watched a demonstration in Chicago
where a typewriter was attached to a phone line, called
Data-Phone. At the other end of the line was a computer belonging to a company located in Massachusetts. By typing a few code letters on the typewriter ,
the operator asked the computer for the current inventory status of a certain item of stock carried by
this company. The computer answered by typing the
total on the typewriter in Chicago. Next the operator
"ordered" three of these items and the machine typed
out an invoice complete with shipping data .
Within a minute , the operator sent back the code
asking for current inventory status and immediately
the new total came back and it was minus the three
just ordered .
From this demonstration it was apparent how many
persons the computer can eliminate, but it was more
than that . The whole transaction had been so impersonal, so fast , so exact, that it was frightening. Although big business has tended to make relationships
more impersonal , there is still a great deal of personto-person relationship in any company and people still
make decisions with other people. With computers
much of this personal transacting will disappear.
Those who know keep saying that machines can't
make decisions and they can only do what people tell
them to do . I wish I were more comforted by these
statements, but I'm not. To me at the moment, the
high stool, the celluloid cuffs, the eye shade, and the
quill pen are symbols of the golden age in accounting.
But these are long gone and the computer is in .
Here is a case where things are likely to get worse
before they get better. For the continuing advance of
the computer will probably not be stopped until that
day when a misguided person in the computer center
of some company suggests mechanizing the board of
directors .
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Faith as Community
By MARC RIEDEL

Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Valparaiso University
In view of St. Paul's emphasis on faith as central to
salvation and of Christianity's emphasis on the Gospels, it is not surprising that much theological discussion has .centered on the concept of faith and that it
has been treated in a variety of ways. Since it is a
pivo~al concept in Lutheran theology through the concept of justification by grace through faith, it might
be expected that an analysis of this concept would give
an insight into this theology; for a theology , like any
doctrine, is a system of concepts. Since the Christian
life and religion in general get their expression and
justification in theological language, such analysis
might further clarify the relation between religion and
thought both in intellectual formulation and in institutional embodiment. Particularly I hope it will shed
some light on the question of the. value of the Christian
university.
An analysis which does not use the traditional theological language is apparently open to suspicion from
the beginning. It is a much re-echoed complaint- in
the daily papers as well as in pulpit pronouncements that the demythologizers from Bultmann through Tillich and Robinson have robbed theology of its true content , since God has been brought down from his transcendent throne outside the world and made just another denizen , though an odd one, of this world or has
been replaced by an impersonal absolute like "the
ground of being" or "the transcendent in our midst."
Without making a detailed defense of particular
claims made in the "new theology," I want to assert
that although it speaks in perhaps an unorthodox way ,
it has true and important things to say. But to separate the message from what may seem a new expression requires some historical perspective.
The early philosophers and theologians of the West
had what may be called a metaphysical task . They
talked about being and nature - the being and nature
of God and of man, of their differences and similarities . When one talks about the nature of things one
needs to find an inclusive view, one which will take
account of all beings, since they are of different kinds.
Without an inclusive view, one is bound to miss something and thus to falsify. Philosophers of the seventeenth century wrestled with a similar kind of task .
The result was that they too were system builders, and
the three beings whose nature they considered were
the three traditional metaphysical topics: man, the
world, and God. Wanting to assert only what could
be proved, they found it necessary either to discover
or criticize proofs of the existence of God, of the external world, and even of the self which proved and
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asserted things. When they talked about faith, they
considered it as a kind of thing too . In such terms it
might be thought of as , for example, a "habit" or virtue which we have when trained in the fear and admonition of the Lord, or as a kind or degree of knowledge which might be taught and learned, or as itself
a state of being in which the soul is at one with God.
At other times , however , the talk of thinkers has
turned to our knowing rather than to the nature of
things on the assumption that before we can say what
is , we must be sure what we can know and what the
limits of our mental powers are. Knowing and judging
may be held to depend on will and feeling as well as
reason and sense, so discussion turned to the relation
between intellect, feeling, and will . If intellect came
off weU, it appeared as a faculty which could grasp
the nature of at least perceivable things and could reason back with probable arguments to the existence of
God , though it could not define His nature. Or, as
with Hegel, it was a faculty which , being in harmony
with the principle of the world, could allow one to be.come identified with it through a process of dialectical
approximation and growth . Faith , also discussed in
terms of the powers of the mind, could be thought of
as an accepting of knowledge given in a revelation
which went beyond our powers to grasp but which
could be buttressed by argument. Or, as by Kantians ,
faith might at least be something akin to knowing and
was justified by postulates of practical reason.
If reason came off badly, the emphasis had, of course,
to be on feeling or will. Then faith too was talked
about as a religious feeling , a creature feeling, or, as
with Kierkegaard, an irrational leap of the will into the
ambiguities and paradoxes of existence, into the rationally unknown but existentially enacted reality of God's
relation to man .
But nowadays talk about a mental faculty of reason,
of transcendental powers of feeling, or of decisions of
the will, afthough these all have their echoes in the
talk of theologians , psychotherapists, ministers, and
evangelists, seems to most people to be made up of
fanciful or at least unverifiable statements about entities we couldn't possibly have any meaningful knowledge of. Contemporary thinkers have consequently
turned to what is immediately given - the facts . By
"facts" I mean the observable events: occurrences of
nature, the social processes of law, government and
science, the operations of investigators and thinkers; in
short, the things which actually go on, including our
ways of speaking.
While we cannot see reason reasoning, we can hear
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ourselves talking. The question about how we thin'k is
now translated into one about how we talk ; so there is
much talk about meaning and language - talk discoursing about its own meaning instead of reason examining
reason, or man investigating nature, including his own .
But actions and feelings are as much "things that go on"
as are speaking, and therefore pragmatisms and existentialisms, which emphasize respectively action and feelings, share the intellectual field with linguistic analysis .
Since the changed forms of discussion involve new
controversies and departures from old habits , one may
think that this turn of events is unfortunate, that the old
way is better. If so, one will applaud the signs of returning metaphysical consciousness among some recent writers. But nonetheless this is the way people talk now and
it is valuable to follow suit for two reasons . First, communication is scarcely possible in any other way and
theologians especially want to communicate. But second,
a discussion of religion and faith in terms of processes
and operations holds some promise of emphasizing one
of the traditional elements of Christian practice which
had for some time been lost, at least among creedally
minded people. Tmt is, it emphasizes the effects on life
of the Christian Gospel and its historic and institutional
processes and contents.
It is in such terms that I wish to speak about faith .
Faith will still be taken as one of the fundamental terms
of theological discourse, or as the fundamental term to
be applied to the individuals' state of religiousness . But
it is not then to be discussed so much as an existing thing
nor as a faculty of the mind or an association of ideas
which needs accounting for . I shall try to discuss it
rather in terms of what faithful people do and say and
have done and said in the historic community of believers .
A further preface is, however, required from anyone
who wishes to be an apologist. For in view of the continual rejection of religion and of the continual identification of faith as an allegedly queer but unverifiable
and hence , to the rejectors , meaningless kind of knowledge, a justification is required for discussing religion
at all. This is further true because the traditional theological statements do not carry conviction , value , or even
meaning to many people brought up in the churches.

Religion as Experience
It is said that God himself is the source of religion.
This is no doubt objectively true, inasmuch as God is
the object of religious doctrine and practice. But inasmuch as talk about God is what is in question in current
discussions of religious knowing , the justification must
rather take its beginning from the facts . The form it will
take then is that of showing what religion is as a human
phenomenon - what it is that religious people do , and
how what they do is meaningful.
One must simply assert, then, that the origin of all
true religion is in experience and that religious stateNovember, 1964

ments are justifiable in substantially the same ways that
any other kind is . But, of course, one must immediately
add that by "experience" one does not refer to the "sensedata" of early positivism. Such entities are less data than
they are results of an abstract analysis of a grosser kind
of immediate experience. Given in immediate experience
are persons and things in relations to each other and to us .
Among the relations are, for example, temporal and causal orders.
It is irrelevant to my purpose to ask how such experience is psychologically generated since most of the
mechanism is unconscious and since neither is there any
conscious state which one knows as its beginning nor is
there any time in the history of the individual at which
he can say that experience was generated or constructed
out of prior materials. At any time the individual has
self-conscious knowledge of a world or may be said to
have experience, he has persons and things in relation.
What is important to say is that not only our apparatus
of perceiving, but also our apparatus of thought, and
just as importantly our action and hence our valuations
determine the experienced nature of the objects. Hence,
a significant conclusion , we experience our world as having existence, meaning, and value at the same time.
Initially our knowledge is limited by narrow perception, action , and purpose. We do not experience all
things at once and consequently the orders of things
known to us may initially be partial or inconsequential.
But successful action as well as objective knowledge and
production of beauty depends on the discovery of the
identities of objects, their causal, temporal , and other relations. Hence, as our action , interest, and valuing become broader in scope, our need to discover such relations
becomes greater, our methods more exact and comprehensive, and our knowledge of the real world more adequate. Conversely, the new and better knowledge may
react to reform purposes and broaden value structures.
The point I want to make is that orders as well as entities are both given and progressively discovered and
clarified and, what is more, the idea of order is implied
in the very possibility of experience and action . The latter being possible and actual, the former is too . In addition , since all experience and action have an orientation
toward the future and the unknown , the sense of and the
quest for order and value always transcend what is known
and the idea of the harmony of things and persons becomes an ideal of inquiry, action, and symbolic production as well as a perceived reality.
It is, of course, true that we do not see or know the
whole order of the universe - if there is such a thing.
If we did, there would be no problems of knowledge.
On the contrary, it sometimes seems that we perceive
absolutely isolated data. This is not literally true, since
every datum is given in some context or other. But some
of our experience is not well related to other parts of it.
Sometimes, also, we seem to see structures and orders
which counteract or contradict each other, as when we
see water run up hill or watch men passionately pursuing
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a self-destructive life. The point, though , is that we look
for the structures that explain the contradictions and
that the ideal of knowledge is the progressive comprehension of initially partial or unrelated experiences into larger frameworks of explanation .
The sense or recognition of orders in things carries
with it a sense or recognition of powers in things, the
energy systems or exchanges that make things go. Many
of the relations we perceive are no doubt trivial ; but
broadly speaking, there are four areas in which we find
such essential and causal orders.
1) We grasp existential relations which govern the
character and processes of nature, including human nature considered simply as an object of investigation .
2) We recognize, choose, and enact structures of value
and law which govern human agency , that is, those
things and relations which because of our nature excite
our appreciation , desire, and directed action or which
would , if enacted, produce greater fitness and happiness
of life.
3) We recognize and construct satisfying and symbolic
forms which express known or felt relations and stimulate new or better attitudes and actions.
4 ) Finally, we have a reflexive grasp of the structure
of experience itself. We can recognize the basic concepts
which structure the language we use, which are implicit
in all our experience or talk about it. We know ourselves
as having knowledge.
As ourselves objects in the natural world we can recognize similarities and differences of structure between
ourselves and it, and thus identify ourselves with it and
recognize directions of movement and change. It is trivial to state that we could recognize nothing which was in
every respect different from us , since it could have no
effect on us. Conversely, it is obvious , but important,
that because of the similarity we can have a sense of community with nature.
As rational agents and to that extent different from
other things , we can recognize rational agency in others.
That is , we can identify values and imperatives as ends
and grounds of action in individuals and in communities and institutions . It is the harmony of orders in things
with our own orders of experience and action which we
experience as beauty and fitness, and conversely the idea
of such a harmony is unconsciously a value and may be
developed self-consciously and rationally as an ideal
governing behavior and serving as the basis for the selflegislation of the moral agent.
The experiences which we call religious may have their
sources in any of these . The first is perhaps least important, except in the tradition of the nature mystics, but the
ordinary sense of the sublime in nature as well as the
scientific ideal of an ultimately unitary source of energy
in the universe may lead to speculation and devotion of a
religious type .
Analysis of experience itself - both of the individual
and of the recorded experience of men and civilizations leads to the recognition of recurrent basic ideas which
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structure all thought . Reflection on the idea of goodness
as an ideal relation of things to our constitution , on the
idea of truth as an objective relation of things to our
powers and techniques of knowing, or the ideas of cause
and effects , time and space, and even the very idea of a
thing lead men to recognize and identify themselves as
unique creatures whose being can be asserted or denied
and preserved and developed or degraded .
Such ideas are a priori in the sense that one cannot
speak or think without making implicit reference to them.
It is by rearrangement of the basic terms - particularly
of thing, being, and existence- that different systematic
structures of thought and language are erected or implicitly entertained. To discuss them , in fact , requires
an antecedent commitment to some use of them. That is
to say, there is a sense in which we can never break out
of the net of language to apprehend realities directly .
This very fact , together with the fact that we nonetheless
do contact reality in our being and action and that language is senseless without a real world to refer to , while
it is a cause of s:>me skepticisms is at the same time a
cause of a search for , a devotion to, even a worship of a
truth independent of statement. It is further a cause of
constant reformation of the theories and doctrines through
which we know what is , and hence a source of theological
speculation and religious devotion .
Artistic expression, at least literary art , is at its best
when it is a crucible in which representation of the realities of character and action is so combined in expressive
form with an intuition of new or permanent possibilities
of life as to make us yearn for levels of feeling , thought ,
and action seemingly possible, but not or not fully realized , to release us from dogmatism and prejudice, and to
stir in us at least the incipience of new character, motivation , and action . To do so requires that the expressive
form so harmonize with th e structures of our own natures ,
inherited or acquired by acculturation , as to evoke a responsive harmony. Perhaps music is the best of all arts
in the respect that, unencumbered by the weight of a concept, it can in the simplicity and perfection of form evoke
a longing for the unspoken together with the peace of fulfillment. But to accomplish fully the end indicated requires the spoken word which pictures the miseries and
the merriments of men and suggests causes and solutions.
Insofar as it does this , art broaches religious concerns ,
and one man 's creation may be the instrument of another's
salvation .
But the rational justification of religion and the pragmatic description of faith given here has its basis in the
knowledge which bears on practice. This is so both becau"se, as mentioned above, our practical concerns determine the direction and adequacy of our inquiries , and
because religion is concerned with the most fundamental
of all our concerns -life, and the values of living. Since
this is our fundamental concern, its end - a good and
blessed life - directs all our activity, including our inquiry, and assimilates to its use all the knowledge we
find in whatever sphere ; for there is no fact that may not
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bear on our purpose. As our end influences even our perception of phenomena, there is no fact which does not
come value-loaded . There are only facts more or less
adequately related to the whole fabric of our lives, or
values more or less rationally related to the facts of those
same lives .
It may seem to be a difficulty that no one really knows
the final purpose of human life, if there is one, and that,
therefore, no one can define the value of anything for not
knowing how it bears on the end. This is true in the
sense that we do not know the final term to the existence
of humanity nor an external purpose imposed on us from
without. The fact that this is so surely shows that our
problem is badly posed in terms of external purposes; yet
since we are purposive or goal-oriented animals the problem is nonetheless one of ends, and we must look rather
for an end internally defined .
One might equally say that no one knows what man's
nature is in the sense of having the final formula of his
structure, if such a thing exists, nor in the sense of knowing the sum of all the unrealized potentials of human nature. Nevertheless we know enough of the basic facts to
know what m'akes life problematic . It is with this that
we begin. Life can be beautiful, but it isn 't always. The
problem thus becomes how can we make it tolerable and
perhaps better or how we should live in view of our small
knowledge and weaker will. (There is no problem about
the meaning of "good" and "better" here. We indicate
our knowledge of its meaning quite commonly enough
when we say "Life can be beautiful, but it isn't .") It is
thus futile to reject moral and religious claims on the
ground that we do not know enough to justify them.
They are concerned with how we live- and die, since
dying is sometimes an act. But while we live we must
work with the problem . There is no choice, at least no
choice but to work it out or die.
Since the end is not fixed in the literal sense, but since
the conditions and elements of the problem are broadly
known, though the specifications change, the problem
of dealing with it in thought and action is a problem of
method. It is how we should choose to live rather than
what we should choose to get or live for which requires
our attention . The method is nonetheless controlled by
consideration of an end to which it leads and the conditions from which it works.

The Development of Community
It is the problem of life, then , and the fundamental
concepts , theories and methods with which it is posed
and resolved in thought, feeling, and action with which
we are now concerned . My claim is that it is this to
which religion is addressed and this to which Christian
faith preeminently gives the answer .
Now we do not live by ourselves and we do not think in
a vacuum . Each man is physically individual. But even
in a biological sense, though each has all the unity and
self-sufficiency of an organism, individuals are interNovember, 1964

dependent members of the species. Though he is born
an individual, it is from the very nature of his individuality that there springs a need for community. Not only
to maintain life but to develop and actualize his potentialities of feeling , thought , and action requires the closest bond with another- a bond that is usually such as to
extend itself and draw others into it. Physically and biologically individual at the outset, he can only maintain
this individuality in cooperative community with others.
Intellectually and emotionally or "spiritually" he attains
to individuality only in and through community . Completely dependent at birth , he has no concrete personality
or individuality , though he has the potentiality to develop
one, until one is formed and he is trained to take rational
control of its continued formation . Even then a humane
life requires a well ordered community.
The development of community carries with it the development of a communal character and a tradition of
thought and action. Conversely, it is in the possibility
of communication in thought, unity in feeling , and cooperation in action that is found the germ or the potentiality and urge toward community. Basic, no doubt, is
the possibility of speech, that is, our capacity to formulate and commit to symbolic expression the rational concept. Hence, it is important to assert that no man is an
island in thought or intellectual accomplishment. The
fame of Newton's phrase that we stand on the shoulders
of giants attests to the fact that even genius does not
flower in a desert. The thought of a new day is a development of the thought of the old, and the later doctrine was
not possible without the earlier. Rationality, knowledge,
grows and develops . And how should it be otherwise?
We know by integrating and broadening our experience.
But the knowledge of the past colors the experience of
the present . Thus theory and experience are in reciprocal
relation.
Since we are all members of a common species in the
same world, there are also common to us some fundamental experiences of that world. These are as available to men appearing early on the scene of rationality
as they are to us . Communal ways of interpreting these
are found which express the insights of a people, relate
them to other experiences, and make them effective in
practice. Broader experience and greater precision of
thought may lead to deeper insight and more comprehensive interpretation in a growing tradition , but even primitive people are in contact with some elemental realities
of life. Thus one of the recurrent problems of thought
becomes the re-interpretation and re-integration of these
fundamental facts in the light both of earlier interpretations and of the permanent possibilities of integration.
Insights and values may be lost , it should be added, as
well as gained when the tradition is lost sight of. Community of thought may extend itself beyond the social
community in which it was born because it has permanent as well as local value, and may be lost or attenuated
in its place or among the people of its origin and become
dissociated from its consequences in character and life.
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We are able to dissociate thought , feeling, and action , as
well as to integrate them , and we tend to form rigid habits as well as to think and act rationally and responsively.
Nevertheless both thought and living proceed through
the developing traditions of communities . Their validity
lies in their being continuing representations of the experience of the community which give insight into the
realities of the world and thus provide the possibility of
an objective basis for action. No less , nor any more ,
can be said for traditions of religious thought than for
scientific. Each is valid insofar as with the fundamental
tools of thought it gathers experience together , discovers
its regularities , integrates these where possible with
others , purges itself of partial or unclear dogmas , and
reaches out to include more. The difference between
them is thus not one of basic method nor ground of validity. Both are valid when and only when they operate so .
The difference is in their ends. The end of science, for
some at least of its practitioners , is the discovery of structures in nature regardless of their bearing on action . It
may even include religion as a phenomenon to be explained, though in doing so it abstracts from its own
quasi-religious devotion to truth . The end of religion is
the whole good of life. As such it calls for , in its best
practitioners , the best of scientific knowledge and ultimately includes all knowledge in its scope since the whole
good of life includes values to be created and enjoyed as
well as virtuous character and action .
Religious knowing, thus, is justified in general as
practical knowing. In particular it is justified if the facts
of experience it deals with and represents are shown to be
crucial to an understanding of life. Religious practice is
justified if it is integrated with knowledge and warranted
by what is known .
To discover whether it is thus justified means necessarily to turn to the community in which it was formed
and to trace out the meanings it has found in the basic
facts it has discovered. The question here is specifically
about the Christian community and its faith.

Human Nature and Conduct
The basic experiences or facts are simple enough , as is
to be expected if they have sufficiently permanent status
to be open to all ; but consistently with what has been
said, they need to be restated , if belief and practice are
to be justified in pragmatic terms .
As was stated above, in our activities of knowing we
look for regularities and orders . This is not to say we
find no irregularity in the world . On the contrary, we
look for order because things sometimes appear unrelated
and irrational and because action requires structure and
predictability in events . We find evidence for thinking
that particular actions and events in nature are spontaneous and irrational or ungoverned . Yet together with
this we note that irrational phenomena in the aggregate
as well as grosser phenomena become predictable. Nature is habit governed or lawful ; and though it seems
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sometimes irrational the aim of theoretical thought is to
reduce irrationality by progressive inclusion of the unexplained in the body of the known and lawful.
Byt specifically the problem o{ religion is a problem
about human nature and conduct. There are four important facts of our behavior that the Christian tradition has
taken account of.
First, our reflection on our own experience leads , as
noted above, to our identification of ourselves as unique
kinds of being. We separate ourselves from the rest of
our local world by our ability to speak, to have concepts,
and to know the world and govern our action according
to our thought . We are free and rational and therefore
have the potentiality for self-government .
Secondly, self-government becomes an issue only because there is something to govern - our emotions and
actions . Emotions leap up in the fire of impulse and , if
left uncontrolled , consume the integrity of the person.
Fulfillment of life, even mere self-preservation, depends
on the organization of impulses into an economy of the
passions . Ideally, then , we should govern ourselves
rationally according to our knowledge of the causes and
the effects of our passions on ourselves and others in the
circumstances in which we find ourselves . That we can
govern ourselves at all is the proof of our capacity to do
so, and that certain passions when in control do in fact
lead to disintegration of personality is the proof of the
fact that ideally we ought to institute a complete economy
of passion under the autonomy of reason . But the crucial
fact is that the passions are forces on their own account,
or rather, they are a moving flux of power in the personality, moving often far below the level of conscious
reflection. If in the name of our fullest development and
of the best life possible for us we place ourselves under
obligation to govern ourselves , we find ourselves unable
to meet the counsel of perfection . Impulse and the unreasoned , unintended actions consequent on it always
break out in new directions and require new controls .
Further, if rational self-government is weak in a person,
as in a society, other elements come into control and form
our "intentions " so that we may sometimes even be said
to intend our own destruction. Yet by nature , if, as
Aristotle said, the nature of a thing is its end, man places
on himself the unconditional demand of self-control
whenever he reaches the maturity of self-conscious rationali"ty , which is to say, whenever by insight or through
teaching he is led to reflect on his own experience and its
conditions .
·.
Thirdly, it is not only the case that human nature is
both impulsive and rational , but we observe that both
thought and feeling tend to take on structures. They
become habitual . It is astonishing with what ease habits
are formed but with what pains bad or outmoded habits
are broken. The mindless impulses which flash out to
destroy momentarily the community between two persons or notions are strengthened by the answering fire
and hardened into habits by the cold truces that follow.
Repeated, they help charge the atmosphere in which
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children still bristle and do battle in the third and fourth
generation. We could, of course, not do without habits,
for no one can think out every action. Yet since circumstances change, it is necessary to change even good habits
or sets of character. We should ideally develop the habit
of rationality to control other habits; but the fact is that
habits , often unconsciously developed , resist not only
new and creative control, but even identification .
What rational self-government concretely demands in
the way of character and action is well enough set out in
the great moral systems not to need detailed treatment
here. Respect and love for self and others, integrity,
good faith , courage, fairness , and equality of distribution
under the circumstances of society are ancient and well
known values and claims. If the moral injunctions people cite are usually negative , the great systems more adequately include positive obligations to develop one's own
talents, increase knowledge and creativity, and do social
and political service. I have said that a man who is
maturely aware of himself and his unique nature lays
these on himself as absolute demands.
What has been said about the emotions and habits,
however, indicates the fourth fact: it is never possible for
man to meet his own absolute demands , and hence such
a person convicts himself under his own law.
Actually, of course, not all men convict themselves
nor feel any guilt. Many have not by experience, instruction, or reflection become aware of the possibility
of autonomy or the achievement of even a limited selflegislation grounded in a comprehensive ideal of life.
Among those that have, the experience is not always one
of guilt, but sometimes one of anxiety , frustration , or
the meaninglessness of life.
The sense of meaningfulness is created by structure
and purpose in human lives . Strangely, as it seems,
their fulfillment in saintly persons is as apt to make us
feel envy and consciousnes& of our own failings as emulation . But perfection in some form makes a claim on
every man. The finished form of harmony calls so strongly that it seems we can only feel our inability as willful
and guilty or cover our despair by rejecting its claims as
alien and setting up another norm. Or if we make no
identification of the end, we may feel what has been
called estrangement from ourselves or our being.
Concretely, because of our social nature and our necessary lives with others, perfection is now likely to be seen
as a human order in which each treats every other as a
free person with rights and worth equal to his own . Trespass on the rights and claims of others and grasping too
much of what is valuable for oneself tend to be more dramatic and painful than our personal failures. Hence I
should think , this fourth basic fact of experience might
find its clearest formulation not in terms of vague anxieties, but in terms of legislation and guilt.
Unfortunately, there is no mechanical way out of this
human situation. A violation of man's automony is a
violation of himself at the root, for his being must be
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defined in terms of it. As the claim is absolute, so is the
violation, and so is the guilt.
Now it is to this situation arising from these common
facts that the Christian faith provides an answer, and it
is through the many-faceted interpretations and expressions of these facts and the answer that the Christian
tradition grows and gains new strength and purpose.
Against the despair which might be the natural consequence of the situation, against the pleasure-seeking life
and other opiates with which we might conceal it from
ourselves, arx:l against the merely social life whose values
we may settle for, the faith calls on us to face the real
situation with courage and to live on with hope because
life with supreme values is possible nonetheless.
The fact that man has naturally the potentiality or the
instruments of self-government together with the fact
that through thought and feeling he can cooperatively,
standing on the shoulders of his predecessors, create
wonders and values after new values is the plain sense
content of the "history" of Genesis. (In a substantial
section of the tradition, notably the eschatological and
apocalyptic writing, there is no essential distinction between history and myth.) Man is created in the image
of God, free, and with the power of reason to name the
animals, i.e., discover their natures and subdue the earth.
("Subdue" differs from "subject" in the rationality of
its purpose to bring each thing as a unique thing of its
own character under a common law rather than to do it
violence under the whims of self.) But, through the devil
and his own flesh , that is, because of disordered powers
in himself and nature generally, he gives up his autonomy, consigns his action to a "foreign" rule, and thus
loses integration of personality and assumes another
character, a fallen state. The consequences , of course,
are radical degeneration of his whole condition. The
rule of passion and bad habit leads to the rape of his environment and the people in it. The self which remains,
the old Adam, becomes grasping for two important reasons. One is simply that the desires grown strong grasp
their objects without regard to the integrity of the objects. The other is that the changed state is unconsciously felt as a degradation . The submerged urge to attain
the better state may prompt misguided attempts to get it
by force of power and thus to reach for greater and greater power of a kind which cannot have the intended result .
The idea of God is not drawn into the account arbitrarily or by sheer imaginative invention. It is a response
to, or rather the meaning of, the recognition that the
whole structure of causes and effects in the world is not
self-explanatory, but itself requires a cause. Similarly,
the ability to live according to his best nature is recognized by man, if he makes any statement about its nature,
as requiring a power beyond his own unassisted and dependent actuality . Powers can, of course, be misidentified, and the fallen man, especially the primitive whose
knowledge and moral culture are not developed, finds
gods and demons everywhere. But the power to recognize the cause of despair and to live joyously in spite of
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it is above all recognized as more than the ordinary
human being can manage. Man believes in God, consequently , not because someone told him God exists, but
because he recognizes God in his world and as the condition of what is. By nature he walks with God in Eden.
It is these real insights which account pragmatically for
the traditional talk of the creation of the world and of
man in the image of God , of the fall of man , of his misery, his conviction, and his guilt before God . In these
terms, it is as the image of God - as free, creative, ordering power- that man judges and convicts himself
and aspires to a better state of character and action.
Important in the tradition is that God speaks to the
essential nature of man, to Adam, and so does the devil.
Adam is in pristine community with God. He gives this
up in favor of a community with one who speaks a different word. But recognizing his bad faith with his pristine community and his desire for it, Adam feels shame
and accepts a new community with God, a community
which involves misery, but when accepted also gives the
promise and the actuality of life. He accepts it, that is ,
when it is offered to him . He has to hear it before he
knows the possibility of the new community. But when
heard, this word has power to call into being a new life
in a new community.
The word is very simply that while the past can in one
sense not be erased , there need be no guilt nor sin involved. Nature is what it is in man and in the world.
Our actions have consequences in the formation of our
own and others' characters, in the pleasures and pains
we cause, in the things we create, and hence in the whole
condition of our lives . Insofar as we choose acts and consequences which are less than ideal we commit sins . The
whole force of rational law is against them . Insofar as
we have the settled character and intention to act thus ,
that is , for the sake of ourselves rather than for the sake
of the right and integrity of each individual under law,
we are in a state of sin. In this state one normally or intentionally violates the image of God in himself, which
is the same as to say one violates true human nature and
thus incurs absolute guilt. The final consequence of this
if left to go to completion is a hellish state of separation
from God and men .

The Forgiving Community
But insofar as we can forgive sin and accept forgiveness, though we may not have nor be capable of an ideally perfect existence, we are free of guilt and of all the
psychological and practical consequences of a guiltridden personality. We are free to do within the limits
and with the tools we have inherited or made for ourselves what is possible to man : to enjoy the world which
is given to us, to learn to know it, and to broaden the
scope of our activities in it. We can be men.
The word of the forgiveness of sin is spoken from one
man to another. Insofar as it becomes an operative concept, that is, insofar as it becomes a source of integration
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of emotion, thought, and action, it remolds the characters of the individuals who speak it so that they may
really achieve a new being or a new kind of communitywith each other. It can only become operative in a community . In the individual, to say the least, it must fight
for its life because of the way in which impulse and habit
tend to evict it or make it mechanical. But when it is
continually enacted and felt , as well as spoken, toward
one by others it can be communicated and established
in feeling and behavior as well as words .
How this is so can be seen better from a description
of the meaning of forgiveness and the nature of the forgiving community. To forgive is not simply to utter the
formula, "I forgive you." For as anyone even slightly
introspective can attest, it is possible to say this to a person and continue to feel indignation or hurt and to let
one's treatment of him be prejudiced by the past act ,
even to break off friendship, though retaining formal
civility, with him. Community, friendship is broken by
a wrong act. It causes hurt , raises suspicion and mistrust. Men cannot live in such a state, as Hobbes noted,
since their lives depend on common action. Therefore
laws and traditions of civility grow up which enable us
to minimize gross wrongs and to maintain some economic and social contact with each other in spite of the submerged feelings and habits which remain after the wrongs .
Polity and civility are very helpful. Indeed, they are
natural and necessary to man.
But they are not yet forgiveness . To forgive a person
is first, no doubt, to recognize that there was a wrong.
But secondly it is to reestablish active community with
the one who did it. This means that one must have some
understanding of the causes why men hurt each othercauses in hurt feelings , fear, guilt, pride, impulse and
habit, even in intentional wrong. Understanding these
as effects of what was called the fallen nature of man to
which one is oneself subject and which is therefore cause
for sympathy rather than superiority, one can refuse to
impute guilt on that account and refuse to lash back in
kind . To remove the guilt is to take away the cause of
despair. The grasping impulse not met by a like opposing one can weaken or die, and it becomes possible for
two people to treat each other as friends and to begin
the re-education of habit which is called sanctification .
To be a friend to a person means, among other things ,
to help him with the things that beset him and cause him
to despair. It means to heal the sick, feed the hungry, to
give back their rights to the oppressed, to help the underprivileged develop their potentialities, and to do all
these not simply for the advantage one's own fallen nature can gain from them, but for the sake of one's respect
and love for what may be called indifferently the true
nature of man, the created possibilities of humanity, or
the image of God in us.
To forgive is to do these things, not to mumble formulas. The community in which these things are done
in this spirit is indeed the community of a new spirit and
a new being. It is not identical with political, economic,
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or social community or the academic or any other community, but it may include them or inform them all . It is
a community of trust in which each acts on the faith that
the others will forgive him and faithfully forgives them.
Without such faith there is no real community. Hence it
follows that faith is not, as is now commonly noted , an
intellectual assent to putative propositions . Faith is a
whole way of living which organizes thought , feeling ,
and action. Thus it is a state of being - a state of active unity within the individual and of actively loving
relation with others. Faith is the bond and principle of
a loving community. In its highest sense, faith is community.
How faith comes to be has always been noted as a mystery for the very good reason that there is no mechanical
.or necessary way of producing such a community or giving its principle to an individual. It is not done simply
by· saying traditional words, for like any other words
they may be misunderstood and thus not heard . It is
done through discourse, but no discourse can be guaranteed to do it. The word can only do its job when it is
a living word, operative in persons and personal relations. As far as verbal discourse goes , it does its job
only when it proceeds together with a powerful example.
The Scriptures are full of examples, but the chief one,
of course, is the figure of the Christ. Performing all the
activities and granting the freedom which were held
above to be the meaning of forgiveness , this Person is
recognized as fulfilling, as men cannot, the perfect intention of creation and demonstrating the possibilities
of life in the actual state of the world . The acts of the
Christ are expressions of the kind of unity of being in
which men are free to develop their different personalities and capacities. Our only appropriate expression
for this state is that it is the unity of God himself.
Even preaching with example does not guarantee that
the message will be heard. It is for this reason that the
churches have always used every instrument of music ,
art, and ceremony to enable the message to be grasped
insightfully . The fact that even these give no mechanical means of producing insightful commitment and that
the concept of faith thus eludes every formula or isolated

act - and it does so precisely because it is the state of
being and not simply of knowing or feeling - is the
essential meaning of mysticism and of the doctrine that
the spirit of God bloweth where it listeth.

The Being of the Ideal
The sequel to this article in the next issue of The Cresset
will apply this notion of faith as community to the idea
of the Christian university. It remains to add here that
the verb "to be," in fact all the indicatives , in the preceeding paragraphs have a curious modality. No one can
point to an existing community in which things are actually this way. If the church is taken to be congruent
with it, the churches are often as full of strife and rancor as any other group of people. Children do not grow
up automatically faithful, and people in non-Western
countries do not, when missionaries preach to them, automatically adopt orthodox piety nor ecclesiastical morality . When faith exists, it is at best imperfect. Yet without it, truly human life is impossible.
These things point to the fact that the being of the
community is the being of the ideal. (For this reason
Christian thought has always been teleological or eschatological in character.) But our warrant for asserting
the reality of the ideal is in the empirically recognized
potentialities of human nature. It is these facts which
govern the curious way in which religious language
works and which account for the absence of positivistic
verifiability. They also account for the fact that questions of the morality of intention as well as religious and
aesthetic questions are badly posed in positivistic terms.
But that is the subject of another inquiry.
The treatment of the subjects of faith and religion
attempted here was to have been a pra.; rn atic , not a metaphysical one. In effect, it is in transit.on to the metaphysical. Its purpose was to elicit meanings which
would show the rationality of religion and its justification in life. But I have said that the problem of faith is
a problem of being and this treatment is thus a prolegomenon to the new metaphysical inquiries to which Christians must soon address themselves.

The Heart Will Know
Sometimes the tortured heart will scale
The pulpit of the skull to preach
A whine of words that grate and pale
Like pebbles, bone white on a beach.
When those wind-caught thoughts slow
And lock in a dreamless drift of weed ,
Then that wounded heart will know
Its only language is to bleed .
-GORDON GILSDORF
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The Theatre

The Mystery of it All
Bv

WALTER SORELL

Drama Editor

The season began with a whimper and a musical bang.
Jean Anouilh will have two plays on Broadway this
season, "Poor Bitos," written in 1956 , and "Traveller
Without Luggage," written and produced in 1937 . The
latter opened first and harvested rnixed notices . The
lukewarmness of its reception is somehow justified and,
though it may not be the best Anouilh who , at that early
stage, tried to handle a Pirandellian topic in an Anouilhesque way, it provides enough theatrical meat to keep
you interested and, above all , it will be fascinating to
compare the earliest with the latest this playwrigh~ has
produced.
The trouble with this production is that some of the
best actors (Ben Gazzara, Mildred Dunnock et al.) and a
seasoned director (Robert Lewis) failed to get into the
spirit of the play, which pictures a soldier of World War
I who lost his memory and for whom the process of regaining it and finding out that the man he comes to
loathe is he himself is a shattering experience, and he
decides to walk out on himself.
It is full of tricks and artifices which would have meaning if the people involved in it would only understand it.
An amnesiac is not a sleepwalker, but this is the impression you get from this production, which does not know
how to make head or tail of it and which , from Anouilh 's
viewpoint, is so obvious and obviously part of the mystery . Perhaps the misunderstanding and misinterpretation begin with the title, in its original called "Le V oyageur sans baggages ." The English word voyager purely phonetically - seems to traverse something yet
unknown, to overcome space in a symbolic way ; he is a
passenger who passes from now to then , not a traveler
who always has a ticket in his pocket and knows his destination. Our hero Gaston does not know his destination, nor where he comes from . He voyages from now
to then. To have made this mysterious journey rather a
bore is the mystery of this production .

The production of the "Fiddler on the Roof," a tale of
Sholem Aleichem, is quite a different matter. Aleichem
was a genius in portraying the common Jewish man ,
wmally a schlemiel, who is a failure in life, but a good
man who can laugh about himself and express himself
with a touch of sentimentality free of mushy feelings ; he
can say the most ordinary things with endearing pathos
and the penetrating look of philosophical depth. He is a
fiddler on the roof whose entire life is a long dialogue
with himself and an even longer monologue with God.
This milkman Tevye and his Jewish horse know about
1 f;

the tribulations of existence. Tevye realizes , though he
is never disrespectful, that one has to make things clear
to the Lord once in a while. "Send us the cure, we got
the sickness already." And when his less philosophically
inclined wife injects some realism, he would, before taking things up with her, politely point upwards, "I'll talk
to You later."
A musical hasn't much chance to develop characters
or a theme, but Jerome Robbins has the flair for putting
meaning, irony, and depth into the atmosphere of a higher reality which holds the impenetrable mystery of our
existence captive. There is the life that lives in a gesture, in a movement, and the improbability of hearing
the wonderful Zero Mastel put his misery into a song
like "If I Were a Rich Man" is wiped out by the film of
magic that keeps us removed from the very reality which
becomes so real. There is humor and theatricality, mu- .
sic (Jerry Bock), and dance. But what matters is that
there is life, bigger than its littleness suggests , lovelier
than its tears indicate, transcending that one tiny notch
that gives the audience the feeling of a huge added dimension .
Imitators of "From the Second City" came from the
West Coast, calling their brand "Committee." The satire is dulled by such cliches as liberals courting the Negro, or girls talking about sex . Nationally advertised
topics must be very clever not to sound parochial.
Where Broadway so easily misses is in the realm of
humor. The "Absence of a Cello" had a better sound
than "A Girl Could Get Lucky," a two-character comedy
by Don Appell playing on a low-brow string, on the poverty of mind and purse. ·one could never be sure whether
the dialogue was real or a parody of low-grade tough
talk, but for sure it is tough to spend a whole evening
with two such people. When Betty Garrett asks Pat
Hingle whether he would marry Grace Kelly if she divorced the Prince, his reply is that there is no point in talking
about it, she is a Catholic and wouldn't get a divorce.
With such a man no girl could ever get lucky, nor could
Don Appell , whose modest wit defeated him.
Ira Wallach's absent cello is more whimsically tuned,
but doesn't quite ring true. It has comic invention, well
paced, it has funny characters, it has a satirical aim
which tries to hit conformity in a typical American suburban atmosphere. The playwright could not make up
his mind whether to write a satire, a farce, or just gags
on the thin string that a brilliant scientist must pretend
to be a conforming nonentity to get a job with a big
company.
The Cresset

From the Chapel

"WE ARE CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER"
BY MACK GOEGLEIN

Assistant Pastor, Immanuel Lutheran Church
Valparaiso, Indiana
I will all the more gladly boast of my weaknesses,
that the power of Christ may rest upon me.
- II Corinthians 12 :9b
All Saints Day is the day on which the Church is to
think about all the saints. Th is seems to be rather obvious . What seems to be not so obvious is the harmful
heresy which has come to accompany current Protestant
meditation on the saints . Note carefully the emphasis
on "Protestant." This correctly indicates that we shall
not waste a moment's time waggling a critical finger at
"those people" who pray to saints or stick those little
"idols" on their car dash boards . The fact is there is
far too much heretical usage of the saints on both sides
of Christendom .
The heresy involved on the Protestant side might be
called the "Strong Faith" heresy. It begins with the
"Jacob's Ladder" approach to Christian faith and life.
It implies that Baptism places the new Christian on the
first rung of this ladder, and then , through a lifelong
process of education, church and Communion attendance, Bible study, and prayer, the Christian continually
climbs one rung of the ladder after another (i .e., "grows
stronger in the faith") until finally he has reached the
top rung of the ladder and can safely be called a "strong
Christian."
Such "strong faith" can be recognized by certain characteristics. At the risk of a bit of exaggeration , several
such characteristics are worth noting: ( 1) The strong
Christian smiles benignly ... always! Whether his wife
has just presented him with a newborn son or has just
run off with the plumber (the latter being the more likely
of the two) , his reaction is always the same- a benign
smile. He strives to be emotion-less or, at least, to be
able to perfectly control his emotions . Only one thing
makes him mad- to slip a rung on his climb up Jacob's
Ladder. (2) The "strong" Christian at least tithes , and ,
in his own humble manner, somehow gets the message
across that this is before taxes , not just from his takehome pay. The church is the recipient of all his gifts
because, not being of this world, he doesn't believe in
supporting non-Christian , secular charities . (3) If he is
"strong" at all, he has successfully learned never to use
naughty words. He has learned the proper interpretation
of the Second Commandment well. Thus "helluva" is
accurately regarded as taking the Lord's name in vain .
Once he has reached rung #8 , he abstains from such
coarse ejaculations as "Gosh" and "Shucks" and "Wow!"
And rung #12 finds him a perfect Christian counterpart
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of Pavlov's dog: he automatically coughs uncomfortably
the moment anyone uses naughty words in his presence.
(4) The "strong" Christian prides himself on his humility. With wild abandon he cultivates the practice of
dropping phrases like "You're too kind" or "It really
wasn 't anything" or ''I'm really inadequate, but I'll try
my best!" (5) The "strong" Christian learns soon to
"speak Scripturally," preferably based on the King James
Version, of course. (6) And above all, the "strong" Christian is rarely bothered with any doubts concerning God,
and the real "saint" no longer knows what such doubts
are like. Thus the Christian on the top rung has this infinite Creator-God tangibly boiled down to his own
little size and claims Him for his personal prize and possession. He naturally enjoys "feeling God's presence"
much more continually than his "weaker" brothers and
sisters .
Now , a few things should be immediately clarified.
This is not a campaign to stamp out genuine humility,,
tithing, or Scriptural language. Nor is it a campaign to
promote profanity, naughty words , or God-doubting.
Also, that "bit of exaggeration" mentioned earlier surely
enough came to pass . But even this will have been worthwhile IF .. .
if we can now better rid ourselves of our natural and
diabolical determination to "climb Jacob's Ladder" . . .
if we can better stop now the useless and harmful
practice of, as one "weak" Christian expressed it, "theological navel contemplation" .. .
and if we understand more clearly that such obsession
with our spiritual progress almost inevitably ends up
with our making our "strong" faith actually our best and
only good work, the reward of which is God's grace and .
favor!
In fact , if you closely consider the lives of the apostles
and prophets (or your own, for that matter), you will
most likely discover that the Christian's faith and life is
most often a matter of great ups and downs, heights and
depths . This seems to be part of the gracious and realistic design of the Father Himself. You see, we can count
on it that, just about the time our faith does really flourish and grow strong, the Evil One will somehow let us
know about it, and the faith itself will begin to replace
God. So it is a thing to be thankful for that our gracious
God will sooner or later knock the props out from under
us again to make it painfully and joyously clear that
apart from Him and His grace we not only can do nothing . .. we are nothing! Praise Him that we can count
on His making us weak, too.
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Aside from the work-righteous heresy involved with
"ladder-climbing," the practical, corporate results within the Church of Christ as she attempts to function as
His redemptive agent in this world are especially disastrous . The Christians who succumb to this dangerous obsession find themselves involved in the pseudo-Christian
game of " buttering up God," of "keeping God where I
want Him ," of "keeping God informed and appreciative
of my progress," etc. And all the while the game is being
played, those Christians become almost totally useless to
God, His Church, and His world!
No, the saints have great lessons for us this All Saints
Day, but they have nothing whatsoever to do with "theological navel contemplation" or games. We remember
the saints wisely for two main reasons .
Whether it's a Joseph or a Jacob, a Paul or a Peter,
their very lives all point us to the grace of God! We're
caused to live again, for example, with a fallen David
who hears the divine judgment: "You are the man!",
and share with _him that grace which brought him the
great news: "The Lord has also laid aside your sin ."
Or we watch with alternating joy and despair the escapades of a paradoxical Simon Peter, and then note with
special astonishment as the gracious Lord picks him up
every time he insists on falling on his face, always prodding him on : "Get on with it, My Rock! You have a Gospel to proclaim, a Church to build, a world to regain!"
And then , of course, ther~ is St. Paul who, after a rather
enviable record of discipleship, comes up with the tradition-shattering remarks in 2 Corinthians 9. How beau-

tifully God kept Paul where He wanted him via that
"thorn" Paul hated so much! But it was nec~ssary for
Paul to learn over and over again the very same lesson
we must keep on learning, too : God's grace really and
truly is all we need. He really can't or won't do a thing
through us if we insist on being strong! Thus the great
St. Paul chooses to glory in his weaknesses . How unsaintlike! How un-American even! Yet , in viewing the
saints in this manner, it dawns on us that we are not
pondering fairy tales today . Instead we ponder real
flesh-and-blood people who lived whole lifetimes under
the judgment and grace of God , and , in that grace, were
called to follow in the Master's way. Strangely parallel
to our condition and calling, isn't it?
That brings us to the other important All Saints Day
lesson . The saints of old clearly demonstrate that the
people of God are to be useful to God. It remains the
amazing nature of the grace of God that it places the
"graced" ones so beautifully at the disposal of God and
His world. So, that world which He so loved and into
which He sent His beloved Son is the world which He
still loves and into which He still sends His beloved
sons , His Church! That world still stumbles in dark
nothingness and meaninglessness . It still needs its gracious Father as desperately as ever. Yet it will not know
this Father unless the Church follows her living Lord in
proclaiming and being His unbelievable love!
To this we have been called . . . as were the saints.
For this we have been and will be graced ... as were the
saints. Let us get on with it . .. as did the saints!

On Second Thought
---------------------------------8 Y

A respected elder brother in the ministry explained it
to me: "Before men I can claim to have accomplished
something, and know that I have excelled. Before my
God I know that I am worthless , and I am humble." I
nodded my assent , troubled by my Lord's judgment on
the Pharisees : "You are those who justify yourselves
before men." The whole fact of the Gospel denies my
friend's statement. Before God we may claim to be good ,
and worthy, for He has called us good. Before men we
may never boast nor claim any worth, for we have nothing which has not been given us, and every virtue has
already been its own reward .
The primary theological evil we have called self-justification dres not mean that we justify ourselves before
God . The Pharisee is not really concerned with God at
all. If he speaks to God, it is only to call God in as audience, as witness to the fact that he is justified among
his fellow men . He does not claim to be sinless, he only
claims to be more sinless than his neighbor. He does
not want the praise of God , he only wants God to assure
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him of the praise of his neighbor. "I thank Thee, God ,"
he says, "that I am better than these other men ."
We are,,all of us , justified before God. Justification
has been ours all the way back to God's judgment on
creation, that it is very good . We certainly have. this
justification, that God was in Christ reconciling the
world to Himself, not imputing their trespasses to them .
This is the grace of God, that He does call us good in
His love. Because He names us so, we are good.
But justification is received through faith, and before
we receive it we must die before the face of our fellow
man. The word that calls us good has called our neighbor good also, for it is a word of grace in forgiveness that
has no limits. If we would have God call us good, we
must know our common weakness among men. Before
men we must surrender o·ur claim to worth and value.
Before men we must abandon boasting, among men we
must be humble. Before God we know our goodness in
His love. "God forbid that I should glory , save in the
cross of Jesus Christ my Lord."
The Cresset

The Music Room

Richard Strauss
----------------------------- B y

The other day a long-suffering reader aimed a blow
at my solar plexus by asking whether I had forgotten to
devote a column to Richard Strauss . "Don't you know ,"
he inquired, "that during the current year the world of
music has been observing the hundredth anniversary of
this famous composer's birth ?"
Fortunately, I was able to parry the blow. "I have
not forgotten Strauss ," I replied . " How could I? In fact ,
I have been planning to say something about him ever
since 1963 began to make way for 1964. "
Strauss was born in Munich on June 11 , 1864 . He
died in Garmisch-Partenkirchen on September 8, 1949 .
It is not my purpose to regale- or bore- you with a
biographical sketch . I prefer to evaluate some of Strauss's
achievements on the basis of my own personal judgments
and reactions.
I cannot remember when I came under the spell of
Strauss's orchestral works for the first time. But this is
utterly unimportant. I do recall , however, that an ingrained spirit of rebellion reinforced my determination
to devote a large amount of intensive study to this man's
music.
Rebellion against what? Well , long ago I used to
bristle with indignation whenever I heard acquaintances
of mine vent their spleen on Richard Wagner. Since I
happened to have a penchant for this master's works , I
could never succeed in squelching the repugnance that
permeated my whole being whenever I was exposed to
such derogatory judgments . I regarded all those venomous remarks about Wagner as hogwash of the most
genuine kind. This , of course, was a purely personal
opinion of mine, and I did not for one moment deny
Wagner's voluble detractors the right to give emphatic
expression to their own views .
But when I read articles in which Strauss was described and, shall I say, psychoanalyzed as a slavish imitator
of Wagner, I decided to investigate. What did I discover? Naturally, I found out that Strauss had learned
much from Wagner- particularly in the domain of instrumentation. Was this a crime on his part? Assuredly
not. If you can show me a composer who is completely
original in every nook and cranny of his music , I shall
be more than willing to eat a storeful of hats.
When Strauss bestrode the scene as a full-fledged composer, the Wagner baiters immediately lifted up their
voices to shout, "Now we have another Wagner! Music
has suffered another serious blow!"
It did not take long for me to realize that although
Strauss and Wagner have some things in common , there
are striking points of dissimilarity.
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I do not minimize Strauss 's skill as a melodist. Yet
no one can deny that he did not match Wagner in the
ability to create tunes that are played, whistled , sung,
and hummed all over the world. Think, for example, of
the widely known melodies in Lohengrin and Tannhaeuser, to mention only two of Wagner's music dramas.
How many tunes from Strauss's Salome and Electra have
made their way into the memories and throats of the
people at large? Not even that great masterpiece titled
Der Rosenkavalier can be called an exception .
I am not forgetting the many art songs from Strauss's
pen . In numerous instances their melodic content is enrapturing beyond description . Wagner, as you know,
did not achieve phenomenal distinction in the domain of
the art song. But Strauss did. In this respect he is related to Schumann, Schubert, Brahms , and a few others .
How could this prophet of raucousness and cacophony,
as the rabid anti-Straussites took pleasure in speaking
of him , become a master in the field of the lied? Strauss's
detractors will deny to the top of their bent that his songs
are genuine jewels. In my opinion, this judgment is
tragically warped and lopsided.
I like Strauss's songs. I like parts of Salome and Electra. I treasure most of Der Rosenkavalier. But I am exceedingly fond of this composer's symphonic poems.
Till Eulenspiegel's Merry Pranks heads my list by far.
Don Quixote comes next. Then there is Ein Heldenleben. Also sprach Zarathustra strives in the sweat of
its color-laden face to be philosophical. The autobiographical Sinfonia Domestica leaves me somewhat cold,
and I can take or leave Death and Transfiguration .
The operas Strauss wrote during the latter part of his
long career do not fill me with ecstasy. To my thinking,
he was at his best during the 1890s and for a few years
beyond the turn of the present century. Subsequently
one often had more than a little right to speak of him as
one who used to be a great composer.
Why should I hesitate to say that I am thrilled to the
marrow by Strauss's crchestral magic? In. this exciting
domain he is unsurpassed by anyone . Even those works
of his that are a bit jejune from a thematic point of view
are filled to overflowing with instrumental wizardry.
Yes , Strauss learned much from Wagner, from Liszt,
and from other composers. But it would be decidedly
unfair to speak of him as a man who lacked striking originality. He owed much to his own efforts, and he was by
no means an apostle of deadening cacophony. He was
far more important, I think, than Stravinsky or Schoenberg. Like Haydn, he seems to have been henpecked to a degree. Maybe this was good for him.
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Hor-Em-Akhet
The Sphinx at Giza
----------------------8 y

.... they are perished also ,
Those walls of Thebes which the Muses built;
But the wall that belongs to me has no fear of war ;
It knows not either the ravages of war or the sobbing.
It rejoices always in feasts and banquets ,
And the choruses of young people, united from all
parts .
We hear the flutes , not the trumpet of war,
And the blood that waters the earth is of the sacrificial bulls ,
Not from the slashed throats of men.
Our ornaments are the festive clothes, not the arms
of war,
And our hands hold not the scimitar,
But the fraternal cup of the banquet ;
And all night long while the sacrifices are burning
We sing hymns to Harmakhis (Hor-em-akhet).
And our heads are decorated with garlands.
Scarcely anyone in the whole civilized world can fail
to recognize the great man-headed lion that guards the
eastern approach to the pyramids of Giza. Because no
full explanation of its significance and existence has
ever been given , the Sphinx has become synonymous
with mystery . It was built, undoubtedly, by Khafre,
the builder of the Second Pyramid.
The Sphinx occupies a hollow which is part of the
great quarry from which workmen cut stone to build the
pyramids . As they took out the hardest and best stone,
this mass of softer stone lay in the middle of the quarry.
To say the least, it was unsightly and it blocked the
view of the Second Pyra mid . The builders then faced
the problem of whether to remove the unsightly mass or
to utilize its shape in the carving of a great monument.
Perhaps the natural shape suggested the form of a crouching lion and so the eyesore became a sublime monument.
The Sphinx is about seventy feet high and about two
hundred feet long. Since the stone was so soft, the body
and paws became eroded by time and countless sandstorms. Later rulers repaired this damage with stone
blocks. The figure faces the rising sun and the face,
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framed by the royal headdress, is an idealized portrait
of Khafre himself. The oft-repeated story that Napoleon's soldiers broke off the nose of the Sphinx when using
it as a target for rifle practice is refuted by an Arab historian of the fifteenth century:
In our time there was a man whose name was
Saim-ei-Dahr, one of the Sufis. This man wished
to remedy religious matters , and he went to the pyramids and disfigured the face of Abul-Hol (one of
the Arabic names of the Sphinx ), which has remained in this state from that time to the present. From
the time of the disfigurement the sand has invaded
the cultivated lands of Giza, and the people attribute this to the disfigurement of Abul-Hol.
By the time of the New Kingdom , the Giza Sphinx
had come to represent the sun-god. It became a place
for pilgrimages, but in spite of this the desert sand continued to half-bury it periodically. Later New Kingdom
representations show a colossal statue of a king standing
before the breast of the Sphinx. All that now remains of
it is a large, uneven vertical projection from the chest
of the Sphinx. All details of form and features have
been eroded away.
It is a lways a mystery why Herodotus did not mention
the Sphinx in his account of the Giza pyramids.
During the Roman period the Sphinx still continued
to be a popular place for pilgrimages and sightseeing.
Travelers also scribbled their names and comments on
the paws of the Sphinx.
The beauty of the lines of the Greek poem , scratched
on one of the toes of the Sphinx (quoted above) is best
illustrated when you see the young people of Cairo singing and dancing on any summer night at the time of the
full moon. In the peacefulness of the desert, with soft
moonlight making the calm features of th~ Sphinx come
alive , one's thoughts turn to peaceful things and blessings.
The scene pictured is a very familiar one except that
the camel looks far more majestic and learned than the
author of these lines.
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Books of the Month

Church and Change
Change is a law of life, and the ability to
deal with change is a capacity both men and
institutions must develop if they are to endure
and mature. Dealing with the phenomenon of
change is also a fascinating problem in the
history of the church. There are strong continuities which link Christians together from
generation to generation, but how much anguish, for example, is compressed in the touching correspondence between the young liberal
Harnack and his conservative father , anguish
in which both the giving and the receiving
generation shared! In times of rapid change,
determining the continuities is a difficult burden, but a burden which each generation must
bear. Church denominations often find it
necessary to declare that they have not changed
and are not changing. This is , of course, not
possible, if only because the Spirit lives .
One important way of dealing with change
so that one does not become captive to the
stream of historical events is to study history
itself. We study history to determine who we
are and how we became that way. Interestingly, one of the denominations most often given
to declaring its changeless character has produced some of the most sturdy denominational history available anywhere. To Forster's
Zion on the Mississippi and Mundinger's
Government in the Missouri Synod, both of
which dispelled much of the mythology that
frequently attends the story of denominational
origins, we may now add a third volume. Dean
Lueking's Mission in the Making (Concordia ,
1964, $7 .50) excels the other two excellent
volumes because the author is not only a his- '
torian but also a theologian, and can draw
important conclusions about the church and
her theology which the first two authors failed
to do . Lueking proposes to narrate a history
of Missouri Synod missions ; but mission is so
central to his understanding of the church's
life and theology that much more is found in
the volume than is suggested by the title.
There is history of Missouri Synod theology
and ecumenical relations here as well, and
done in such a compelling way that the reader
is forced into a significantly higher sense of
self-awareness. Lueking sees Missouri Synod
theology resulting from the peculiar fusion of
scholastic and pietistic currents which took
place on the Continent in the early part of the
last century. The fusion was particularly peculiar because, historically, pietism had arisen
in protest against Lutheran scholastic orthodoxy. Now the opposites embraced, producing bipolar tendencies, scholastic and evangelical . New to the nineteenth century was a
renewed preoccupation with church relations
and thus a new concern with the Lutheran
confessions, shared by both tendencies. The
scholastics tended to regard the confessions
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as constituting a protective barrier against
overzealous intim acy with non-Lutherans; the
evangelicals tended to regard the confessions
as a bridge toward unity . From the latter
group came the impulse for mission. Lueking's thesis , as it finally emerges, is that from
the experience of the latter group we can find
the resources in the Missouri Synod for a vision of the church's task that can measure up to
the contemporary challenge. The narrative
is fascinating; the thesis is constructive. For
those of conservative temper, attached to the
Missouri Synod on account of the many values
preserved through periods of erosion in Christendom, this thesis offers a meaningful way of
not repudiating the past uncritically but appropriating that which has always vitalized
the denomination even though for decades it
may have been largely underground (or overseas).
That this theological point of view is now
stronger than ever within the denomination is
attested by many signs. Henry Reimann's
Let's Study Theo1ogy(Concordia, 1964, $1.50)
is "an invitation to the excitement of C hristian thought in the 20th Century." It might
also be correctly sub-titled a summary of that
evangelical catechetical theology which, in a
widening stream , has come from Concordia
Seminary, St. Louis , since the mid-forties.
Anyone who has attended that institution
since that time should recognize the currents
of thought which here are so plainly summarized. The liturgical movement, the new awareness of confessional teachings, the new biblical
studies , the ecumenical perspective: all these
are brought together in a statement of a gathering tradition . The tragic recent death of the
author cannot be minimized; but he did articulate a tradition of evangelical theology which
is vital today. Gone is the fundamentalistic
attitude toward the Bible. Gone is the separatistic attitude toward the church. The result
is not a watered down theology but a vintage
which , while breaking old wineskins, can
vivify and excite good preaching and intelligent response today.
Concordia Theological Monthly is now undertaking its responsibilities with much greater sensitivity to the explosion in theological
knowledge which has marked this half century. This venerable journal, long Concordia
Seminary's semi-official voice, has in the past
decade become increasingly responsive to
current studies and trends. Now, more venturesome than ever, the journal is attempting
to communicate to its readership some of the
more important results of contemporary theological scholarship. The first such special
issue is out, devoted entirely to Old Testament studies . The issue represents a cautious
consensus of theological scholarship, the sort

of thing that should elicit more trust then suspicion. It is a good issue, and deserves serious treatment. The new biblical theology
can much facilitate the development toward
a more adequate evangelical theology. But
it will be a pity if biblical studies will now
attract all our energies while systematic studies fall into disrepair. This seems, in fact, to
have happened. Thus in this issue certain
contemporary slogans may have been accepted
too uncritically. The concepts "Heilsgechichte" and "covenant" are common coin in biblical studies; they are central to this issue of the
CTM. Yet they have theological implications
which ought to be made very clear. Covenant
theology has a long history behind it, most of
it in strict Calvinistic and Arminian traditions .
The notion of "Heilsgeschichte" has received
some important criticism by a number of theologians. The entire "acts of God" approach
tends to obscure Lutheran insights which the
Law-Gospel distinction seeks to protect, and
disregards other modes of revelation found
within the biblical writings themselves. In
this connection we cannot recommend too
highly a brilliant little article by James Barr,
entitled " Revelation Through History in the
Old Testament and in Modern Theology."
This is included in Marty and Peerman's excellent collection of articles entitled new theology no. 1 (Macmillan, 1964, $1.95), which
will annually present a cross-section of interesting work don e around the world in theology. In this article Barr- who has a talent
for discovering the meaning of the obvious shows how the elusive concept of history unites
all major theologies today, but at the same
time obscures the vast differences between
some of them. The use of this term , therefore, is a clue to some very fuzzy thinking.
After reading this article, few will dare to use
"history" without sober reflection .
Systematic and dogmatic studies have been
in decline recently. It is timely, therefore, to
point out that the John Knox Press has been
publishing inexpensive but valuable works
connected with the formation of Barthian
theology. One does not have to be a Barthian
to know that conversation with this modem
church father is essential to any recovery of
dogmatics . A collection of correspondence
during his formative theological years, between himself and his collaborator Thumeysen, Revolutionary Theology in the Making
(1964, $5 .00 ), is fascinating reading, particularly for parish pastors. Thurneysen's study
on Dostoievsky, constantly referred to in the
correspondence as the little volume which
prepared the way for Barth's new standpoint,
is out in paperback (1964 , $1.50).
Even Karl Barth's table talk is available in
a volume by that name, edited by John God-
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sey ( 1963 , $1.75). These are conversations
with students on themes from his J.Jogma tics,
deal ing with many controversial questions,
but always from th e grand dogmatic tradition.
This little book is for theologians. For theo-

logians a nd the wider educated public, n o
better introduction to Barth's life a nd thought
can be found than George Casalis ' Portrait
ofKarl Barth (Doubleday Anchor, 1964 , $.95).
Robert McAfee Brown trans lated it. Much of

the book is biographical ; a third is clear analysis of his theology. In any case, it is the
most helpful volum e on this subject with
which we are acquainted.
RICHARD P . BAEPLER

Tale of Two Cities
In 194 7, in th e case of Everson v. Board of
Education, the United States Supreme Court
refused to disa llow the expenditure of state
funds in tra nsporting New Jersey children to
parochial schools. A state law had authorized sc hool districts to provide transportation for school children, a nd pursuant to the
statute, the Ewing Township Board of Education authorized reimbursement of parents who
sent their children to school by public transportation. Th e a uthorizat ion included reimbursement for the parents of children attending Roman Catholic schools .
The case came before the Supreme Court
on the con tention of a taxpayer in the school
district that the New Jersey law was in effect
an establishment of religion and consequently in violation of the First Amendment. By a
5-4 margin the high court rejected this contention . Justice Black, writing for the majority,
maintained that the statute served primarily
a public purpose- getting children safely to
a nd from school - and that the a id it provi ded to churc h schools was a n incidental and
hence permissible effect.
But in framing his decision, Justice Black
enu nciated an ed ict which was to have far
reaching consequences. The "establishment
of religion" clause meant that neither a state
nor the Federal Government cou ld pass laws
whic h aided one religion or aided all. Here,
according to Charles E. Rice, was the " semantic springboard for the questionable decisions
to follow." The culmination of these decisions ca me in June of 1963 when the Supreme
Cou rt invalidated the use of the Lord's Prayer
and read ings from the Bible as devotional exercises in public schools. In The Supreme
Court and Public Prayer: The Need for Restraint (Fordham University Press , 1964 ,
$5.0 0 , 202 pp.), Professor Rice of Fordham
U nivers ity's School of Law has carefully described a nd criticized the evolution of the
court from Everson to School District of Abington Township v. Schempp a nd Murray v.
Curlett.
One year before the Schempp and Murray
decisions, the Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional the recitation in public schools
of the New York State Regents' Prayer. The
reader will recall the storm of public indignation that ensued . But the winds of dissent
arising from Engel v. Vitale were broken
somewhat by the fact that the contested prayer was the composition of a state agency . This
featu re was absent from the later decisions.
Since 1963, religious exercises of any sort
within the public schools have been , in the
view of the Supreme Court, violations of the
First Amendment.
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As the qualifications of Professor Rice
would suggest, this is not just anoth er o f the
tiresome tirades against the Supreme Court
that have been publi shed over the last d ecade.
Rice is thoroughly opposed to the decisions.
The first sentence of his preface removes a ll
doubt on that score: "The school prayer dec isions, handed down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1962 a nd 1963 , were
wrongly decided. " And his concluding chapter is headed by a L incoln quotation (in reference to the Dred Scott decision): "I believe the
decision was improperly made and I go for reversing it." But his criticism is carefu lly documented, closely reasoned , and temperately
argued. It deserves thoughtful attention.
Rice 's argument moves on several levels .
He endeavors to show, first of a ll , that the
prayer decisions are not securely rooted in
judicial precedent, but derive rather from
obiter dicta (especiall y Justice Black's comments in the Everson case) and highly a bstract
reasoning. Tied in with this argument is his
attempt to show that history lends no support
to the meaning given by the present court to
the First Amendment. Moreover. Rice argues
that these decisions did not in fact make government neutral in religious matters , as supporters maintain. They rather elevated a definite
religious belief, agnosticism , to the pos ition of
an official belief - contrary to the manifest
will of the American people, of Congress, a nd
of presidents from Washington to Kennedy.
Finally, the logic of the decisions will compel
us steadi ly onward a long a radical course that
we neither wish to follow nor ought to follow:
toward elimin ation of tax exemptions , cha plains. the use of God's Name in political ceremonies, and governmental aid to hospitals.
schools , or any other religiously tainted institutions. There is little basis for supposing
that the court will refrain from pushing the
logic of its own argument a ll the way. For
judicial restraint has been sacrificed by the
present court to unhistorical and abstract
conceptions.
This is the essence of Rice's argum ent. The
remedy proposed in the last chapter is a constitutional amendment, a long the lines of the
current Becker amendmen t, to restate for the
benefit of the court t he actual meaning of the
Constitution's ban on establishment of religion or abridgement of its free exercise.
A great gulf currently exists between those
who vigorously support the substance a nd implications of the prayer decisions and those
whose religious sensitivities or just plain pietistic prejudices have been damaged by the
decisions. Professor Rice's book can help fill
a dangerous gap in our discourse.

Mater et Magistro, the social encyclical of
Pope John XXIII , is a lengthy document in a
long tradition. When it was released by the
Vatican in the summer of 1961, William Buckley suggested in the pages of National Review
that, whatever the encycl ical's final effect, " it
must strike many as a venture in triviality
co ming at this particular tim e in history. "
Buckley is a Roman Catholic. He is also a
thoroughgoing political conservative. In addition, he is possessed of a quick wit , a fac ile
pen , a nd a remarkable ability to delight conservatives and infuriate liberals with almost
every word he writes. Two weeks after this
initial comm ent , the National Review publish ed the following in a miscellany column:
"Going the rounds in Catholic conservative
circles: 'Mater, si; Magistra , no ."' And the
battle was on .
America, the highly respected , Jesuit-edited
journal of generally liberal outlook, led the
charge. Buckley a nd th e National Review
which he ed its were accused of a bominable
taste and of rebellion against papal authority.
Diocesan papers picked up the attack and suggested that the whole affair might serve as a
salutary warning to Roma n Catholics inclined
to sympa thize with the political stance of National Review. Buckley replied quickly . After
pointing out that National Review is not a sectarian magaz ine and hence could not be accused of rebelling against a church it does not
represent, he offered to debate the entire issue
in the pages of a Catholic publication .
The o ffer to d ebate was never accepted, but
as the controversy raged back and forth the
pos itions of th e disputants becam e clearer.
Buckley did not wish to contravene the teaching authority of the Pope nor the authority of
this encycl ical. But he was disappointed by
certain emphases and omissions that a ppea red
to him to open the encycl ical to misunderstanding and to exploitation by enemies of its
intention. He denied , moreover , that the encycl ical ruled out as a n option for Roman
Catholics National R eview positions on contemporary political issues.
Buckley's critics generally revolved th eir
a rgum ent around the claim that Mater et
Magistro ha d in fact spoken clearly on a range
of controverted political issues , a nd that
Buckley and company were in rebellion because the pronouncements of the encyclical
sq uared poorly with the philosophy , prejudices, and preferred policies of National Review.
The affair of Buckley a nd Mater et Magistro
is reviewed in Part One of Politics and Catholic Freedom by Garry Wills (Regnery , 1964 ,
$5.95, 302 pp .). Wills is a young Roman Catholic lay scholar who became interested, through
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these events, in the larger question of the use and
misuseofpapal encyclicals. Exactly what authority does an encyclical possess for the faithful?
When the Pope discusses contemporary political institutions and problems of the social order,
does he lay down an official " line" with respect
to historical , economic, and other non-theological issues in controversy? As Will Herberg
points out in the foreword to this study, these
questions are of interest to non-Catholics , also,
as is amply attested by the traditional American
fear that a Roman Catholic president would accept dictation from Rome.
Wills provides no easy answer. What he offers instead is a painstaking, often difficult , but
in variably frank and unquestionably significant treatise on the proper understanding and
implementation of the papal magisterium .
Wills contends, in general , that an encyclical
establishes the terms of its own authority if it
is read with honesty and intelligence, rather
than in search of "proof passages" or with an
a priori conviction that the Pope was verbally
inspired even in his most incidental comments.
This reviewer does not have the qualifications
even to suggest that the study is definitive. But
if it is not, the definitive study still to be written
will have to begin with this book .
And it is , we repeat , an important book . For
the thoughtful reader will be compell ed to reflect once again upon the vital and constructive
tension between theological commitment and
hum an freedom. For freedom of conscience is
not only indispensable; it is also empty if it does
not mean "the right of conscience to recognize
moral claims upon it." As Wills observes , " Liberty, like love, both looses and binds. "
Paul T . Heyne

WORTH NOTING
SAMUEL JOHNSON: THE LIVES OF THE
ENGLISH POETS : SELECTIONS
Edited by Warren L. Fleischauer (Regnery , $2.45)
When Sherlock Holm es told his friend Dr .
Watson , "You see, but you do not observe!"
he expressed a principle of literary criticism
which is still the core of all good interpretation . Well , here is a convenient anthology
(published in 19 55 hardback ) of crisp observations upon 17th and 18th Century British
authors by one who still ranks high in English
L iterature. Notably , Johnson's language is
clear, unlike, e.g. , Lytton Strachey's later
psychography or today's jargon .
Back in 1767 it was King George Ill who ,
in a celebrated intervtew as recorded by Boswell , "expressed a desire to have the literary
biography of this country ably executed, and
proposed to Dr. Johnson to undertake it. "
Thus four volumes ( 17 79 ) plus six ( 1781)
featured a selection of fifty-two poets made
chiefl y by the sponsors, two-score London
booksellers . The naturally unequal critical
estimates , colored by Johnson's honest prejudices, frankly reveal his opinions upon life
and neo-classical principles. Sense of fact so
dom inates or excludes the im aginative quali-
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ties that especially lyric poetry is unappreciated. Johnson was under-sympathetic towards Gray and Milton , over-generous to Pope
and Dryden, although the attack upon Lycidas did not vitiate Johnson's liking for L 'A llegro or II Penseroso.
In this paperbound Gateway Edition th e
print is remarkably legible, on quality stock.
Possibly it is the flaw of merely my review
copy that the pages look unbalanced , too much
margin at the top, definitely too little at the
bottom! The purposive yet short Introduction , sensible Notes , and Selected Bibliograph y
reflect credit on editor Fleischauer who is preparing for the press the definitive Yale Edition . Granted it wou ld expand this miscellany
a little, but inasmuch as we here have the complete vitae of Savage, Pope, Coll ins, and
Gray - then why not likew ise (because, as
given , it is merely "Fro m") the entire Cowley,
Milton, Dryden, and Addison?
Herbert H. Umbach

NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS
By Harry Caudill (Atlantic, Little, Brown ,
$6.75)
Mr. Caudill 's book is a forceful reminder
that the United States faces problems as
grave as race and closer to home than communism . His is one of a number of recent reports which focus on the apparently substantial , though usually invisible, percentage of
the population for which the American dream
is an hallucination . Caudill concentrates on
an area where poverty is chronic and endemic: the hill country of eastern Kentucky .
The book is a biography of an area which sociologists (with singular infelicity considering
its altitude) term a "depressed area," an area
ignored by the nation, and incidentally, by
most of the Church.
As befitting a biographer, Caudill starts
from the beginning, in this case the richly
endowed country into which pushed the earliest settlers shortly after the Revolution. In
turn came the Civil war , laying the foundation
for the infamous clan feuds , then the progressive isolation of the area , and finally , coal
mining, first shaft, then strip . The biography
is one of progressive exhaustion of the people,
the land , and finally hope.
Caudill does not sentimentalize about the
average contemporary resident of eastern
Kentucky: physically debilitated, uneducated,
lethargic, hopelessly corrupted by the public
welfare without which he would probably
starve. For decades , the case has been one of
reverse evolution; the young and ambitious
leave, to turn up in Cleveland, Chicago- and
Valparaiso. Even th ere, though , their heritage continues to dog them. One of Caudill's
most effective quotes is from a man laid off
by elementary automation:
I kept my young-'uns in school anyway.
I come back home to the mountains and
raised me a big garden ever ' year and
worked at anything I could find to do . I
sold my old car fer seventy-five dollars
and I sold all the land my daddy left me

and spent the money on my children .
( My oldest boy) h ad good grades m
school and I figured he'd get him a job
easy. He went out to California where
he's got some kinfolks and went to a factory where they was hirin ' men . The sign
said all the work hands had to be ... highschool graduates. Well , this company
wouldn't recognize his diploma because
it was from a Kentucky school
But
they agreed to give the boy a test to see
how much he knowed and he failed it flatter than a flitter. They turned him down
and he get a job work in' in a la undry. He
jist barely makes enough money to pay
his way but hit's better than settin '
around back here .
Caudi ll 's qu ietly controlled writing makes for
fine, if utterly disheartening , reporting. The
solution he suggests is essentially an updated
TVA. Though the present administration is
sponsoring rehabilitation measures , chances
for a determined , broad attack seem slim indeed. The man quoted above was probably
right when he concluded:
I reckon they jist ain 't no future fer
people like me. Me and my wife ain't got
nothin' and don't know nothin' hardly .
We've spent everything we 've got to try
to learn our young-'uns something so they
would have a better chance in the world ,
and now they don 't know nothin ' either.
What can one do?
Alan Graebner

A MOVEABLE FEAST
By Ernest Hemingway (Scribner's, $4 .95 )
" If you are lucky enough to have lived in
Paris as a young man, then wherever you go
for the rest of your life, it stays with you , for
Paris is a moveable feast ." - Hemingway to
a friend , 1950.
"If the reader prefers , this book may be regarded as fiction . But there is always the
chance that such a book of fiction may throw
some light on what has been written as fact ."
-from the preface to A Moveable Feast,
1960 .
When referring to his theory of understatement and why he did not include the old
man 's suicide, which was implied, in his story
"Out of Season":
"This was omitted on my new theory that
you could omit anything if you knew what you
omitted and the omitted part would strengthen
the story and make people feel something
more than they understood. "
To a large degree , much of what Hemingway has to impart in "A Moveable Feast" is
summed up in the above three quotations .
Though Hemingway writes about his first
wife, Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein, Ford Madox Ford and the F. Scott Fitzgeralds in the
context of their early 20's Parisian relationships in cafes, bars , and Sylvia Beach 's bookstore, one is only dimly aware of actuality as
an objective scene; rather one sees these relationships of the past through the eyes of a
man desiring (from 1957-1960) to capture the
essential human qualities and insights that
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come through memory and feeling. Conversations as reported in the book are subj ected to
the same tests of essentialness, therefore
what is reported is most likely much less than
was spoken, but is concentrated in order to
show the meaning of what was said in significant situations; especially wh en dealing with
Zelda and Scott Fitzgeralds' relationship to
one another and to Hemingway .
There is a great deal of help in understanding the effect of poverty on the young AngloAmerican writers in Paris during this period.
They learned and exercised a type of transcendence of reality in order to sense the tragic
qualities of life while they were certainly not
always in tragic or noble situations. The hunger and companionship of the period come
through as a part of the imagination of the
people involved - an imagination that was
able to appreciate through the poverty certain
values that might not have been sensed if all
had been eas ier. At least this is the impression that Hemingway co'nveys.
Gertrude Stein once stated that Hemingway's real life in Paris in the 20 's might make
better reading than the fiction he wrote. It is
my opinion that both his ficti on as fi ction and
his memoirs as fiction are excellent and that
A Moveable Feast is a book very much worth
owning.
H . Samuel Hamad

A COMPANION TO
THE GRAPES OF WRATH
Edited by Warren French (V iking , $5.00)
It is difficult to determine whether John
Steinbeck's Nobel Prize has found him any
new fri ends . Most of his vocal detractors
leveled harsh criticism at the Nobel Committee for making such a serious mistake.
But it seems that those critics and professors
and reviewers who were previously on the
fence are still there . Only th e college students
have had a continuing admiration for Steinbeck.
A few things, however , are generally acknowledged: Steinbeck is a superb stylist, he
might be more profound , and The Grapes of
Wrath is his most notable novel. H e has not
been subjected to the same kind of formal
criticism that Hemingway and Faulkner have;
but there a re two or three quite acceptable
books about him , and one of these days he
may even become a thesis topic.
In any case, A Companion to The Grapes of
Wrath is not really designed to take sides in
the argument over the worth of Steinbeck. It
assumes that readers are still interested in the
Steinbeck novel , and that they would like to
know more about the background , the circumstances , and the reception of this almostclassical piece of fi ctional propaganda. We
shudder at the word "propaganda" now , because not many writers have causes to fight
for, and not many novels get very excited
about anything at all. We live in a literary
and social world of peace and safety (with the
possible exception of the race question , which
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is itself calming down , or the communist question , which is largely a hobby for unemployed
bigots). Nevertheless, our decade was nurtured in the thirties, and it cannot hurt us to
remember the Steinbeck cause.
The surface problems of the thirties were
drouth and unemployment, but the deeper
concern was humanity itself. While Steinbeck hacked away at the social a nd economic
injustices, and awakened the United States to
action , he was really concerned with human
behavior and the re1ationships between people. His basic themes of end urance and love
have been considered stale and simple by
some critics ; yet, Faulkner preached endurance in his own Nobel acceptance speech, and
most of the major writers of this century have
strongly suggested that love is the only salvation of the hum an race.
Mr. French's coll ection of materials includes the essay, "Their Blood Is Strong,"
which formed the basis of the later novel.
Students interested in the important relationships between historical source and compl eted
fiction wi ll discover much of value in this essay. It is unobtainable elsewhere. Beyond
that , the book has the standard pieces on the
novel's reception , especially in Oklahoma ,
and on recent reactions among coll ege professors . One remembers the congressman from
Oklahoma who vil ified Steinbeck in the Congressional Record ; or the public offi cial who
cond emn ed the novel but at the same time admitted that he had not read it. It is likely that
some of Steinbeck's critics might change their
minds abo ut him if they read his books .
Quite asi de from literary matters, the present college generation should find A Companion useful in establishing rapport between
their own decade and the thirties. It will help
t hem to understand the occasional plaintive
remarks made by their fathers.
JOHN MILTON

THE INFERNAL MACHINE
By Jean Cocteau (A New Directions Book ,
$6.50 )

Jea n Cocteau is one of those innovators in
world literature whose influence is greater
and more far reaching than the works themselves. Cocteau has earned the reputation of
being the enfant terrible of French letters .
Because of the fact that his gifts were surprising in so many fields - he was a poet, essayist, novelist, actor , film-maker among other
things- , one cannot help thinking of how much
he co uld have really achieved had he concentrated on one medium .
The collection of his plays by New Directions- it is only a small selection of his
plays -shows what a unique dramatic talent
he had and , reading these plays, one cannot
help thinking of how much he could have
given to th e drama had he chosen this medium
as means of express ion exclusively . But it
seems that his many-sidedness was part of his
charm , restlessness , and temperament , which
one can sense in each of his various works.
Th e remarkable feature about this collection is the presentation of each play in what
seems to be the best available translation .
The names of W.H . Auden, e.e.cummings ,
and Dudley Fitts as some of the translators
testify to this fact . They also prove the point
that American poets too rarely take time out
for translations. Of the faur full-length plays ,
"The Infernal Machine" is the best known
and, dealing as they do with classic myth and
legend , "Orpheus " and " Knights of the Roundtabl e" show Cocteau's iconoclastic approach
to his subject matter.
"The Eiffel Tower Wedding Party" is a
ballet with words , one of those unique experiments to which we a re so used by now. But it
was Cocteau who showed the way. It has
scintillating wit and is a tour de force as a
farce and " the manifes to of a poetic spirit,"
as Cocteau proudly says of it in his own preface. It is to be hoped that this collection will
help to make Cocteau , this fascinating experimental dramatist , better known .
WALTER SORELL
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A Minority Report
Of Polls and Issues
-------------By

VIC T 0

R

As this issue of The Cresset is being assembled , all
signs point to a Goldwater defeat.
The polls, all of them , have reported large margins for
President Johnson. Major metropolitan newspapers , reflecting in some measure the consumers of their regions ,
have endorsed the incumbent. Certainly newspapers
with the larger circulations have come out for Johnson.
Persons who travel the country report littl e substantial
enthusiasm for Goldwater. Goldwater and Miller have
also confessed that they were down, the underdogs , that
they have had a lot of ground to make up, even to make
a good showing in November . Many prominent Republicans on all levels of government have run from firm and
clear endorsements of the GOP national ticket. Betting
odds have shown no trend to Goldwater. Roscoe Drummond (Chicago Sun- Times , October 1 , 1964 ), after a
ten-day trip to the states of the Midwest , calculated:
"Are the polls going haywire? I find little ev idence to
suggest that they are. The Gallup and Harris polls and
the surveys taken privately in behalf of the two candidates all point in the same direction - an overwhelming
Johnson lead in the nationwide vote . Goldwater is behind in Nebraska, Indiana, Oklahoma, Wisconsin , Iowa ,
North Dakota, South Dakota and even Kansas - all
Nixonland in 1960." On the same day , Samuel Lubell
indicated that Goldwater is losing ground.
By the time the reader picks up this issue, he will have
known the outcome, at least the winner.
Yet, what this all means is something else again .
If Goldwater wins , given the status quo, poll analysts
and social science investigators will be forced to do some
solid soul-searching about their tools , their techniques ,
and their professions. All along, it is fair to say, the pollsters have been worried.
In the first place, the pro-Johnson margins are unbelievably large, way beyond the four or five per cent
margin of error which most social scientists do recognize
at the outset in this kind of investigation. One of these
analysts has quipped about this in private: "At first we
thought the machine had gone nuts."
In the second place, there are a lot of silent people this
year who ''no comment " a lot of questions. Who are
these silent people? Are they people who are reluctant,
or even afraid, to say they are for Goldwater or for Johnson? Are they Democrats who are upset about the Negro
and Civil Rights? Are they defectors who want to come
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home next time around?
In the third place, there are a lot of undecided voters.
There always are . There is a lways doubt about which
way the undecided voter will go. Will he go to vote at all?
Obviously , it is argued by some, a combination of " no
comment" and undecided voters cou ld easily make the
difference for Goldwater.
In the fourth place, a crucial issue, even if basically
trivial in nature like rocks in the Pacific, could re-arrange
the election predictions implied in poll analyses. As we
go to press, the Jenkins affair could be such an issue.
As a matter of fact , it appears that the GoldwaterMiller tandem has sent up a lot of trial balloons in pursuit of a crucial issue: the President's war record, Humphrey's vice-presidency in the ADA , the war-mongering
president, Bobby Baker, high taxes , conventional nuclear
weapons and the like. On these "fishing trips" for an
issue, the contenders have seldom had a jerK on their
lines. These issues are crucial and ought to be discussed
but the President gives them very little attention and
voters have shown very little concern. And if you were
serious about issues , how would you go about discussing
the great society, lawlessness on the streets , and what we
shou ld do about Vietnam? The difficulty and complexity of the issues simply compound the already basic
apathy of the American citizen. No men are so perfect ,
certainly not Democrats , that somewhere, sometime
some issue cannot be used against them.
Looking at Johnson as the projection of th e Rooseveltian , progressive era, we are about ready to say that history is ready for a change and is already re-constructing
the old and new forces under the surface of contemporary events. Humphrey , Johnson, Kennedy and company
have all gotten about as much mileage as one can out of
the liberal cliches. Goldwater's people claim to be pushing the case of conservatism but there are conservatives
and there are conservatives. In my opin ion , the contenders did not present a very coherent and rational case for
conservatism . This is too bad for , in my estim ation , the
country is ready in nearly all walks of life for a new set
of concepts and hidden assumptions whether they are
called conservative, liberal , or something else. The
mere negativism of the "outs" soon begins to look after
a while like simple irresponsibility and that can be terribly corrupt.
Who will gather up the alternatives? Time will tell.
The Cresset

Sights and Sounds

Voices from the Past
-------------------------------------------------------------8
"The Shadow knows." During the heyday of radio
serials these words , spoken in sepulchral tones , sent
shivers of anticipation up and down the spines of countless avid listeners. With the advent of television The
Shadow, The Green Hornet, and other tried-and-true
radio favorites passed into oblivion. But not long ago an
enterprising program dit.ector had the courage - or the
temerity- to broadcast a taped transcription of an episode from The Shadow. The reaction was both prompt
and surprising. Letters of commendation poured in not
only from older generations who had nostalgic memories
of the original broadcasts but also from younger listeners. Advertisers became interested , more than a hundred
stations picked up the program, and now a full-fledged
revival of the radio drama seems to be in the making.
Who knows ? Once again the air waves may ring with the
cry "Hi-ho, Silver! "
Although radio is looking backward at the moment ,
the silver screen is looking forward. On September 23
and 24 an actual Broadway presentation of Hamlet
(Theatrofilm , Warner Bros. , Bill Colleran ) was presented
in 1,00 0 theaters from coast to coast by means of a remarkable new process known as Electronovision. This
is the first stage play to be filmed during a regular performance - in this case three performances - of a
Broadway presentation . Seven small electronic cameras
set up at carefully selected vantage points fed impulses
by cable to a standard motion-picture camera stationed
in a truck outside the Lunt-Fontann e Th eater.
It would be foolish to say that Hamlet, as presented
through Electronovision , was an unqualified success. It
was not . The lighting was poor, the images often were
either blurred or harsh and coarse-grained, and the
sound was far from satisfactory. I discussed these matters with the theater manager during the intermission .
He emphasized the fact that Electronovision is in an experimental stage, but that methods had already been devised to correct the faults I have mentioned. When the
process has been perfected, audiences throughout the
nation will be able to see current Broadway plays with
the original casts. There is one big IF. The success or
failure of this ambitious undertaking will depend in large
measure on audience response. I observed one curious
omission in the elaborate and widespread publicity for
the Electronovisi:m production of Hamlet. No credit
whatever is given to one William Shakespeare. His nam e
does not appear a nywhere. Instead , the play is billed as
Richard Burton 's Hamlet. This really is the height of
the ridiculous.
Sir John Gielgud chose to mount his production of
November, 1964
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Hamlet in modern dress. For me at least the curious
mishmash of drab attire, as well as the stark backdrops,
are disappointing . Mr. Burton's portrayal of the melancholy Dane had depth , power , and poignancy. Alfred
Drake, in the role of Claudius, and Eileen Herlie, as
Queen Gertrude , towered above the other members of
the supporting cast. With the exception of George Rose,
as the roguish gravedigger, their performances were decidedly weak and pedestrian.
I had read Jean Anouilh 's prize-winning drama Becket,
subtitled The Honor of God, with keen interest. Experience has taught me that many fine plays have been utterly ruined on the screen, and I was almost afraid to go
to see Becket (Paramount, Peter Glenville). For once my
fears were groundless. Becket is not only a distinguished
film, but the screenplay is completely faithful to Anouilh 's
compelling study of the bitter and tragic struggle between Thomas a Becket and his friend Henry II of England. Richard Burton is superb in the role of the martyred Archbishop of Canterbury. Peter OToole portrays
the tormented and mercurial Henry with brilliant success.
The settings are magnificent , and the direction is as
sensitive as it is penetrating. Each of the supporting
players makes a substantial contribution to an outstanding achievement.
Early this year two ambitious young men had the courage , the vision , and the disenchanted enthusiasm of
youth to produce a film which they knew would be highly
controversial. Sam Weston and Larry Peerce were inexperienced , and they had a limited budget. As a matter of
fact , they ran out of funds before their picture cou ld be
cut and edited. This obstacle was overcome, and the enterprising producers entered One Potato, Two Potato
(Cinema V , Larry Peerce) in the Cannes Film Festival ,
where it won a best-actress award for the star, Barbara
Berrie.
Racial prejudice is a dangerous and unresolved issue
of our day . One Potato, Two Potato makes an impassioned plea for tolerance, understanding, and justice.
The simple story is told with restraint and good taste,
the acting is exceptionally good, and the direction is excellent. Although this is a surface study which does not
plumb the depths of an age-old problem , Messrs . Weston
and Peerce must be applauded for a valiant effort in the
right direction .
Polly Adler's book A House Is Not a Hom e stripped
prostitution of every vestige of glamor. It portrayed
this ancient profession as a cold, ugly , degrading business which corrupts both the buyer and the seller. The
film A House Is Not a Home (Embassy, Russell Rouse)
has not captured either the spirit or the intent of the book.
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Pilgrim
"All the trumbets sounded (or him on the other side"
- P ILGRIM' s PROGRESS

-----------------------------BY 0.
The World in Microcosm
I was reared on the sidewalks of New York. My earliest memories include the recurring roar of the Elevated ,
the steaming pavements of New York on hot July mornings , and the mysteries of the livery stable next door.
Our house was surrounded by the .homes o'f immigrants
from Eastern Europe, the Balkans , and the lands bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In winter there was a long
trudge to school. Concerning nature we knew only that
trees were in parks and grass was something to keep off
of. In the vacant lots covered with tall weeds and in the
damp basements of tenement houses the preacher's kids ·
learned to live tolerantly and to adjust life to its immediate needs.
Our code of ethics was practical, though limited. No
rocks (they were never called stones, always "rocks") in
snowballs , at least not big rocks. No telling a guy's mother
anything when she tried to quiz you about Giusseppi
Mattiani or Moe Birnbaum or Paddy O'Reilly. No making fun of a guy's religion unless he was a Catholic , in
which case an occasional jeer about incense and vestments was permitted. If Paddy O 'Reilly was an altar
boy- as he usually was - he was compelled to defend
his religious activities with everything from rotten carita- /
loupes to sticks every Monday evening.
Our code, however limited it may have been, was rigid . Three whistles on a late summer afternoon as the
sun stood low and red beyond the Elevated meant that
the Arthur Avenue gang was headed our way . All good
men and true forgot home and mother and internal strife ,..
in a united effort to drive back the invader. Now , fifty
years later, I read the world news and recognize with
something akin to pain and surprise my friends and
enemies of the sidewalks of New York. The same passions, the same loyalties , the same techniques , on a larger scale, perhaps, and with more deadly consequences,
but still deeply and essentially childish. The world is
not run by adult minds. It shares with those long-ago
sidewalks the same absence of permanent meaning, the
same loud boasts , the same dire threats, the same false
sense of importance.
We too fought for "freedom ." Were we to be permitted
to walk home through Crotona Park without constant
attacks by marauding raiders? It was a question of life
and death . Harassment could not. be tolerated. We sent
formal notes to the Arthur Avenue gang through Mickey,
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my little brother, who was so little that not even that
conscienceless crowd would assault him , informing them
that unless things were better by next Saturday our patience would be exhau~ted and we would have to fight.
Our honor demanded it! Of course, like any mode·r n
secretary of state or foreign minister , we always knew
what the answer would be. Mickey would invariably
come back as though he were returning from a summit
conference, with his shirt hanging out and one shoe left
behind as a hostage. His report was always the same:
"Dey said you guys can go jump in Crotona Lake. " But
the amenities were observed, and our wars passed through
the same preliminary steps which now mark the tactical
movements of those whom we consider the great figures
of contemporary history.
North of us were a few nice homes inhabited by strange
people called Baptists and Presbyterians. They were all
sissies . With black threats they could always be persuaded to pay tribute in the form of a nickel or a dime
for a new bat or for penny cones from Mr . Goldstein's
store on the corner of 118th Street. Our Khrushchev
was a big guy who strutted and shouted , but even Mickey could scare the daylights out of him by looking him
straight in the eye.
In some ways, though, we were more decent than today 's grown-up tyrants. There was a truce every Sunday ,
not only on Christmas Day. We always forgot our differences when there was a fire or a Fourth of July celebration . Religion was stronger than the ties of race or blood.
I still remember my surprise when I saw Pat and Dominic,
leaders of rival gangs , walking in procession side by side
at the dedication of St. Anne's church.
It has been half a century since I left the sidewalks of
New York for the sheltered life of prep school and seminary. For the past twenty-five years I have lived in a
pleasant small town on the rural edge of a metropolitan
district. So most of what I know, or think I know, about
life in a modern big city is what I read in the newspapers
and magazines. I gather that there is a new element of
viciousness in it, and if this is true I am not surprised ,
for the life of the big-city sidewalk has, historically , mirrored the larger world. It is in the city, not the small
town , that we see the world in microcosm. And I must
confess that sometimes , when I look back over these
fifty years and see the changes that have taken place in
the city, I wonder how much farther we can impose on
the patience and long-suffering of God.
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